University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Masters Theses

Dissertations and Theses

March 2019

Visual Recollection for Non-Declarative Representations
Patrick Sadil
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Sadil, Patrick, "Visual Recollection for Non-Declarative Representations" (2019). Masters Theses. 751.
https://doi.org/10.7275/13036518 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2/751

This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

VISUAL RECOLLECTION FOR NON-DECLARATIVE REPRESENTATIONS

A Thesis Presented
by
PATRICK S. SADIL

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE

February 2019

Cognition and Cognitive Neuroscience

© Copyright by Patrick S. Sadil 2019
All Rights Reserved

VISUAL RECOLLECTION FOR NON-DECLARATIVE REPRESENTATIONS

A Thesis Presented
by
PATRICK S. SADIL

Approved as to style and content by:

____________________________________
Rosemary A. Cowell, Chair

____________________________________
David E. Huber, Member

____________________________________
Joonkoo Park, Member

__________________________________
Caren Rotello, Department Chair
Psychological and Brain Sciences

ABSTRACT
VISUAL RECOLLECTION FOR NON-DECLARATIVE REPRESENTATIONS
FEBRUARY 2019
PATRICK S. SADIL, B.A., REED COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS, AMHERST
Directed by: Assistant Professor Rosemary A. Cowell
Recollection is a pattern completion process that enables retrieval of arbitrarily
associated information following minimal study. These attributes enable recollection to
support retrieval of many kinds of mnemonic representations, from highly associative
contextual information to very specific low-level representations. However, recollection
is typically studied in the context of declarative memory tasks, in which participants
exhibit recollection by explicitly reporting on the recollected information. Is it the case
that recollection is limited to declarable representations, or is it a more general process
that occurs for any representation? Two experiments and a novel analysis technique are
presented to answer this question. The results suggest that recollection is not limited to
declarable representations. These results argue against theories of recognition memory
that restrict the representational input allowed to mnemonic processes; mnemonic
processes in general may act on arbitrary representations.

v

CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT .........................................................................................................................v
LIST OF FIGURES ......................................................................................................... viii
CHAPTER
1.

VISUAL RECOLLECTION FOR NON-DECLARATIVE

REPRESENTATIONS ........................................................................................................1
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................1
2.

CFS STATE TRACE ...............................................................................................7
2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................7
2.2 Methods............................................................................................................11
2.2.1 Participants ........................................................................................11
2.2.2 Materials ...........................................................................................11
2.2.3 Procedure ..........................................................................................12
2.2.3.1 Study Phase ........................................................................13
2.2.3.2 Test Phase ..........................................................................15
2.2.4 Analyses ............................................................................................16
2.2.4.1 Overview of State-Trace Analysis .....................................16
2.2.4.2 Correction for Guessing .....................................................19
2.2.5 Results ...............................................................................................21
2.2.6 Discussion .........................................................................................23

3.

HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN STATE-TRACE ANALYSIS ............................25
3.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................25
3.2 Detail of State-Trace Analysis .........................................................................25
3.3 Hierarchical Multivariate Probit Model for State-Trace Analysis ...................29
3.4 Model Recovery Via Simulation .....................................................................36
3.5 State-Trace Analysis Applied to Experiment 1 ...............................................38
3.6 Remaining Shortcomings .................................................................................39
3.6 Discussion ........................................................................................................40

vi

4.

VISUAL RECOLLECTION ..................................................................................42
4.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................42
4.2 Methods............................................................................................................46
4.2.1 Participants ........................................................................................46
4.2.2 Procedure ..........................................................................................47
4.2.2.1 Ocular Dominance .............................................................47
4.2.2.2 Opacity Calibration ............................................................47
4.2.2.3 Main Experiment ...............................................................49
4.3 Analyses ...........................................................................................................50
4.4 Results ..............................................................................................................52
4.5 Discussion ........................................................................................................54

5.

GENERAL DISCUSSION ....................................................................................56

6.

FIGURES ...............................................................................................................61

APPENDICIES
A.

METHODS TO ASSESS CONVERGENCE OF HAMILTONIAN

MONTE-CARLO ..............................................................................................................74
B.

WIDELY APPLICABLE INFORMATION CRITERION ...................................77

REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................82

vii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

Figure 1 A subset of the representational hierarchy ................................................................61
Figure 2: Example stimuli used in the Gollin Incomplete Pictures task. Figure reproduced
from Hirshman (1990). .............................................................................................62
Figure 3 Sample test questions in Experiment 1. .....................................................................63
Figure 4 Crossover interaction was observed in Experiment 1. ..............................................64
Figure 5 State-Trace analysis of Experiment 1 ........................................................................65
Figure 6. Hypothetical cognitive models comparable with state-trace analyses. ....................66
Figure 7. Negative effect of measurement dependence on STA. ............................................67
Figure 8. Schematic of the Bayesian hierarchical multivariate probit model. .........................68
Figure 9 Simulated data for STA .............................................................................................69
Figure 10 Experiment 2 task ....................................................................................................70
Figure 11 Descriptive plots of Experiment 2 performance ......................................................71
Figure 12 Quintile analysis of Experiment 2 ...........................................................................72
Figure 13 Posterior of the effect of study on the shift in the RT distribution. .........................73

viii

CHAPTER 1
VISUAL RECOLLECTION FOR NON-DECLARATIVE REPRESENTATIONS

1.1 Introduction
Memory has classically been divided into more basic processes such as priming,
reflex, and fear-conditioning from the more complex including episodic memory and
semantic memory. Central to this division is the notion of non-declarative and declarative
memory processes, whereby the more basic are non-declarative whereas the others are
declarative (Squire & Dede, 2015; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). This thesis focuses on
the mnemonic process of recollection. Recollection will be operationalized as patterncompletion, whereby an individual is presented with only part of a previously
encountered stimulus and must generate details of the rest of that stimulus (Montaldi &
Mayes, 2010). Recollection juxtaposes familiarity, which is a pattern-matching process
(Norman, 2010). That is, familiarity does not generate information about a stimulus but
instead outputs an index of how well a stimulus matches stimuli that have previously
been encountered. There is much debate about the mechanisms underlying these
processes (i.e., threshold vs. continuous-valued; e.g., Greve, Donaldson, & Van Rossum,
2010; Pazzaglia, Dube, & Rotello, 2013; Yonelinas, 2002; Yonelinas & Parks, 2007).
However, this distinction between a generative (recollection) and a matching (familiarity)
process is generally accepted by dual-process theories of recognition memory (e.g.,
Norman, 2010; Norman & O’Reilly, 2003).
The processes of recollection and familiarity have been characterized as being
differently useful for distinct kinds of memories (Yonelinas, 1999, 2013). Recollection is
often characterized as being able to produce arbitrary associations, learned after only
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minimal (i.e., “one-shot”) study, and the content is often episodic in nature. That is, the
representational domain of recollection tends to be linked to a particular time and a
particular place. Mandler’s classic example of retrieving the details of your butcher and
his shop (i.e., complex, contextual information) after encountering him on the bus
exemplifies this relationship between recollection and higher-level representations
(Mandler, 1980). Likewise, studies that rely on source recognition construct tasks where
participants must recollect the context (e.g., gender of speaker, scene image, font color)
in which an item (e.g., word, picture of a face) was studied. Recollection is assumed to
occur when participants retrieve episodic information. In this thesis, representations that
are episodic in nature will be contrasted with information that is learned over longer
periods of time – gestalt information about how visual information tends to be organized
(where ‘tends to be’ is something that must be learned through experience), the statistical
properties of the visual world1.
However, the extent to which recollection only occurs for certain kinds of
representations is unknown. A restriction that recollection only generates declarative
information contrasts with the predictions of an account of memory called the
Representational-Hierarchical (RH) account (Cowell, Bussey, & Saksida, 2010; Kent,
Hvoslef-Eide, Saksida, & Bussey, 2016; Murray & Bussey, 1999; Saksida & Bussey,
1998). A central claim of the RH account is that mnemonic processes such as recollection

1

The distinction between episodic and statistical information is somewhat oversimplified. There are
instances in which researchers (who claim that recollection and familiarity are differently useful for
different kinds of representations) note that familiarity can support the rapid learning of novel associations
and content (Mayes et al., 2004). One mechanism by which familiarity can support such learning has been
termed ‘unitization,’ which is predicted to occur when the association to be learned can be processed as a
conjunctive whole (as compared to a collection of associated parts) such as when learning faces.
Alternatively, familiarity may support the learning of representations within a representational domain
(e.g., associations between faces), but not between representational domains (e.g., a face and an object).
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are performed on any mnemonic representation. That is, the RH accounts claims that
there is not necessarily a reason to hypothesize that pattern-completion can only occur for
certain kinds of patterns. The primary question of this thesis will be whether recollection
can occur for non-episodic representations. Recollection for non-episodic representations
will be called “visual recollection.” Visual recollection corresponds to a process whereby,
e.g., a participant is given only part of an image of an object (e.g., a picture that shows
just the handle of a teapot) as a cue and recalls other, low-level visual details of that
object – without necessarily retrieving higher-level representations of the object. Visual
recollection will be contrast with “episodic recollection.” Episodic recollection is defined
as another recollective process (perhaps initiated by the same parts of objects), but one in
which higher-level representations are recollected. Episodic and visual recollection are
therefore differentiated only by the kinds of representations that they are defined to
generate2. That is, they are not meant to imply qualitatively different processes or
neurocomputational mechanisms. Instead, they are meant to be suggestive of a single
pattern-completion process that happens for two different points on a continuum of
differently complex representations which range from low-level visual details to highly
associative episodic representations. The central question of this thesis is: to what extent
can visual recollection proceed without episodic recollection (Figure 1)?
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The operational details for how to infer presence of recollection (either visual or episodic) will
necessarily depend on the experiment. For example, as discussed above, asking whether participants
recollect the source of a studied item is one typical way of measuring episodic recollection. A challenge to
studying visual recollection is the need to use a task that enables participants to demonstrate retrieval of a
memory, but that doesn’t rely on their ability to explicitly declare the retrieved memory. See Chapter 4 for
the operational definition of visual recollection utilized in this thesis.

3

Studies involving individuals with medial-temporal lobe (MTL) damage-induced
amnesia have provided some evidence that visual recollection can occur, even when
participants have limited episodic representations. For example, in the fragmentcompletion (also known as Gollin Incomplete Pictures; Figure 2) task, participants are
presented with line drawings of objects at progressive stages of completeness, one at a
time, from least complete to most complete. Across sessions of being asked to name the
same objects, participants learn to identify the objects at earlier stages of completeness.
Individuals with MTL-damage induced amnesia are able to improve on this task, despite
a lack of an explicit memory earlier sessions (Milner, Corkin, & Teuber, 1968;
Warrington & Weixkrantz, 1968). That is, even though such participants have only the
low-level cues of the incomplete pictures at the time of test (given that they have no
memory of performing a similar task at previous occasions), they are able to learn
associations between the fragmented image and the whole object, then retrieve those
associations to identify the object from the fragments.
Similar to the performance of individuals with amnesia in the incomplete pictures
task, Graf, Squire, & Mandler (1984) famously discovered that individuals with MTL
damage-induced amnesia fail to recall previously studied words, but nonetheless
complete word-stems with those studied words. Specifically, these individuals failed to
generate studied words when they were given the word-stems of those studied words and
instructed to list recall the full word that they studied. However, when simply instructed
to complete the word stems (i.e., when not instructed to produce words from the study list
but instead produce whichever words came to mind), individuals with amnesia completed
the stems with words that they studied. That is, even though the cues for these two tasks
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were the same (a word-stem of a studied word), individuals with amnesia only generated
information about the studied items when given instructions that did not emphasize
effortful recall.
Although the successful retrieval of information by individuals with amnesia that
are cued by low-level information is suggestive of a visual-recollective process
(recollection for non-episodic representation), these studies do not provide unambiguous
evidence that visual recollection can proceed without mediation by higher-level
representations. Whether the learning of intra-item visual associations can proceed
without such mediation is not answered by these studies for two reasons: 1) participants
were free to associate the low-level details with higher-level representations at the time of
study, and 2) the measure of memory was the production of the studied item’s name. The
first reason makes it unclear whether the retrieval processes utilized by participants with
amnesia was contingent on the encoding of associations between lower- and higher-level
representations. For example, in the incomplete pictures task, participants may have been
able to identify the patterns at an earlier level of incompleteness – not because they had
learned “lateral” associations between the fragments – but rather because they had
associated the fragmented image with the whole object. Any retrieval of missing visual
details might have occurred via a “top-down” association between the whole object and
the missing visual details. In this way, any visual recollection that might have occurred
would have been mediated by associations between the lower- and higher-level
representation.
The second reason highlights a challenge of studying recollection for visual
details in a behavioral setting; tasks that measure recollection by asking participants to
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explicitly generate at test the names of studied material require participants to produce
multiple levels of information. Visual recollection is defined as the pattern-completion of
low-level visual details. In this thesis, it is assumed that the semantic identity is a higherlevel representation than just the visual details. This assumption follows from the
intrinsic link between the semantic identity of an object and its visual conjunctive
representation; awareness of the conjunctive visual representations is assumed to occur if
and only if there is awareness of the semantic identity of an object. With this assumption,
data that attempt to measure visual recollection for low-level visual details are ambiguous
as to whether lower-level representations could be generated without simultaneous
generation of higher-level representations. Considering again the fragment completion
task, it is seen that an inability to identify an object from a largely incomplete image of
that object does not necessarily measure the extent to which some parts of that object are
still retrieved.
This thesis presents two experiments and a novel analysis technique to ask
whether visual recollection proceed for lower-level visual representations without
mediation by higher-level representations. The experiments were designed to bypass the
two challenges listed above. The first experiment asks whether the learning of lateral
associations between the visual details of objects can be decoupled from the learning of
associations with higher-level representations. A novel analysis technique that builds on
state-trace analyses will be developed to handle the data produced by the first experiment.
The second experiment asks whether lateral associations between lower-level
representations can support pattern-completion of lower-level visual representations.
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CHAPTER 2
CFS STATE TRACE

2.1 Introduction
The first experiment examined whether the learning of lateral associations
between the visual details of objects can be decoupled from the learning of associations
with higher-level representations. Lower-level representations were operationalized as
intra-item parts of objects, and higher-level representations were operationalized as the
identity of the object (Figure 1). In this experiment, participants studied objects in two
conditions that were hypothesized to differentially facilitate the learning of either
associations between intra-item features or association between intra-item features and
the semantic identity of an object. That is, assessing the dissociability of top-down (i.e.,
the ability to retrieve intra-item features when given the identity of the object) and lateral
associations required prior learning conditions that selectively boost the strength of each
type of association. The flow of top-down information might be selectively enhanced by
studying an object’s name but not its visual details, whereas lateral associations might be
selectively enhanced by studying an object’s visual details without awareness of its
identity. The key manipulation therefore relied on comparing participants’ memory for
objects that were studied as words as compared to words that were studied under
continuous flash suppression (CFS: Tsuchiya & Koch, 2005). CFS entails simultaneously
presenting a salient masking image (e.g., flashing, overlapping squares; referred to as a
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‘Mondrian’3) to a participant’s dominant eye and a second image (e.g., a picture of an
object) to their non-dominant eye. The masking image renders participants unaware of
the image presented to the non-dominant eye. The CFS condition exposed participants to
the visual details of the objects while limiting their awareness of object identity. The
Word condition, in which subjects studied object names without CFS (i.e., participants
were presented the word, no image, with full awareness), provided object identity but not
the visual details of the tokens of objects participants would encounter at test.
Additionally, a “No Study” baseline condition and a “Binocular Image” control
condition, in which objects were studied as visual images without CFS (providing visual
details as well as full awareness of object identity) were included.
To what extent does CFS prevent access to the semantic identity of objects?
Previous studies have shown that CFS can provide an approximate way to prevent lowlevel visual information from being processed in a conjunctive manner. For example,
participants are relatively insensitive to Gestalt information of items that are masked by
CFS (Moors, Wagemans, van Ee, & De-Wit, 2016). Moreover, there is currently no
strong evidence that the semantic information of images masked by CFS are retained by
participants (Gayet, Van der Stigchel, & Paffen, 2014; Gelbard-Sagiv, Faivre, Mudrik, &
Koch, 2016). Hence, it appears that CFS breaks the typically automatic association
between the intra-item parts of an object and the identity of that object. Note that, for the
CFS manipulation to be successful, it does not need to be the case that participants were
completely unable to derive any semantic information from the objects that they

3

The eponym Mondrian refers to the painter Piet Mondrian, given that the masking images resemble
aspects of his paintings.
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encounter under CFS. Even if it were the case that participants could derive non-specific
information (e.g., whether an object was artificial or natural, whether the object is
typically large or small), the CFS manipulation was only designed to limit participants’
awareness of the identity of the objects that were encountered in this condition4.
To complement these study conditions, two tasks were required that were
differently sensitive to either the learning of intra-item associations or the learning of
vertical associations. In a “Part-matching” task, participants indicated whether a pair of
parts came from the same or different objects. In a “Naming” task participants attempted
to provide the object’s name from a visual part cue. In the Part-matching task, each part
was a circular patch drawn from an object, chosen to be unrecognizable when viewed in
isolation. Specifically, participants were given a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC)
between a pair of patches (e.g., 𝐴1 and 𝐴2 ) that came from the same object, 𝐴, versus a
pair of patches (e.g., 𝐴1 and 𝐵3) that came from two different objects, 𝐴 and 𝐵. With a
common patch in both choices (𝐴1 ), the task amounted to identifying which other patch
(𝐴2 versus 𝐵3) was associated with the common patch. In the Naming task, which was
administered immediately after each 2AFC Part-matching test, participants were again
presented with the common patch (e.g., 𝐴1 ) and asked to name the object from which it
was drawn. Analogously to how participants seem to know which dots in a Mooney
image belong to the same object without knowing the identity of that object (van Tonder
& Ejima, 2000), the 2AFC Part-matching task can be performed intuitively in the absence
of object identification (e.g., perhaps familiarity enables them to determine that “those

4

Although the processing that occurs for images masked by CFS during the masking may provide insight
into definitions of different levels of consciousness (e.g., Dehaene & Changeux, 2011), that discussion is
beyond the scope of this thesis. It is for this reason that we utilize the relatively neutral term “awareness.”
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patches just seem to go together”). In contrast, the Naming task requires access to object
identity knowledge, but production of the identity can occur in the absence of lateral
associations between separate parts of an object. To assess whether intra-item
associations can be retrieved separately from top-down associations, we therefore tested
for a dissociation between 2AFC Part-matching and Naming.
The dissociability of lateral associations from vertical associations was indexed
by the following predictions. CFS was predicted to enable the learning of lateral, intraitem associations, but provide less learning (if any) of associations between these object
parts and the objects’ identities. Therefore, a dissociation between lateral and vertical
associations required that study of objects masked by CFS boosted 2AFC Part-matching
performance with little or no benefit to the Naming task. In the complementary Word
study condition, participants studied with full awareness only the word-name of each
object. This condition was predicted to support the learning of object identities, which
may influence subsequent test performance via top-down associations (i.e., from object
identity to part 𝐴2 ) but was not predicted to support learning of bottom-up or lateral
visual associations (because there is no viewing of the subsequently tested object parts).
Therefore, a dissociation between lateral and vertical associations also required that study
of the object boosted Naming performance with little or no boost to performance in the
2AFC Part-matching task. These boosts are relative to the No Study condition, and
performance in the Binocular condition was predicted to be highest in both tasks.
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2.2 Methods
2.2.1 Participants
A minimum of 1000 data points per condition were sought. Participants were
recruited through the University of Massachusetts, Amherst’s SONA account and campus
fliers. In total, 53 participants completed the experiment. Participants were compensated
either with course credit or at a rate of 10$ per hour.

2.2.2 Materials
Images of 144 unique, everyday objects (e.g., chair, couch, monitor) were
gathered from the internet. Images of objects were presented in gray-scale, cropped and
resized (maintaining the aspect ratio of the original object) such that the longest cardinal
axis (horizontal or vertical) of the object extended to 295 pixels. Objects were
superimposed upon a gray (RGB values: [161, 161, 161]) background of 300x300 pixels
and framed by a 150 pixel white border. They were displayed on a 24” LED monitor at a
resolution of 1920 x 1080 (120 Hz refresh rate).
Object patches were created using three aperture views (circles of radius 80
pixels) of each object. The view through an aperture could potentially include some of
the background as well as part of the object. The choice of aperture location was
constrained such that the ratio of object to background visible through each aperture was
no less than the ratio of the object to the background in the entire 300x300 pixel image.
Fixed pairings of the objects were determined in advance (creating 77 pairs from the 144
objects), with each pairing chosen to yield a pair of mismatched apertures (i.e., apertures
from two different objects to be used as the foil stimulus in the 2AFC task) that were not
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obviously mismatched. Each pair of objects was used to create two different intactrearranged 2AFC trials, with both trials created from a given object pair being assigned to
the same study condition. For instance, object 𝐴 had three apertures (𝐴1 , 𝐴2 , and 𝐴3 ) and
object 𝐵 had three apertures (𝐵1, 𝐵2, and 𝐵3). From these apertures, two different 2AFC
Part-matching trials were created: 𝐴1 -𝐴2 (intact) versus 𝐴1 -𝐵3 (rearranged), and 𝐵1-𝐵2
versus 𝐵1 -𝐴3 . Both trials were then assigned to the same condition (e.g., “Binocular”).
Mondrian masks for CFS were constructed from overlapping, colored rectangles.
The rectangles were presented in a cropped, 300x300 pixel square, centered on the
presentation screen. The Hue, Saturation, and Value (HSV space) of the colors of the
squares were determined by uniformly random samples between [1/6, 1]. The width and
height of the rectangles were randomly chosen to be between 15-40 pixels. 1000 such
rectangles were drawn for each mask.

2.2.3 Procedure
Experimental code was written with MATLAB (MathWorks, 2015) scripts using
the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007). Prior to the main
experiment, ocular dominance of each participant was measured via the Porta test (as
performed by Roth, 2002). Figure 3 presents an overview of the main experimental
procedure.
The experiment contained nine blocks, each with a study phase and test phase.
Participants encountered 16 objects per block (8 pairs of objects), with each study trial
presenting just one of the 16 objects. The two objects in each pair were assigned to the
same study condition. The assignment of object pairs to blocks was fixed across
participants, but the study condition for each object pair was randomly determined for
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each participant, with the constraint that each block contain 4 test trials for each of the 4
conditions. The study conditions were (1) No prior study, (2) Word (the name of the
object was presented in text form, rather than the image), (3) CFS (the image of the
object was presented, masked by CFS), and (4) Binocular (the image of the object was
presented without CFS masking).

2.2.3.1 Study Phase
During the study phase of each block, participants saw 12 objects, one at a time (4
from each of the 3 conditions that contained prior study). The order of the 12
presentations was pseudo random, disallowing more than 3 presentations of the same
study condition in a row. Participants studied the 12 items in the same order twice, with
the second presentation of the list of items immediately following the first. Each study
trial began with a 500 𝑚𝑠 fixation square, followed by a CFS mask (presented
binocularly), with a 150 𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑙 white border. On Word trials, the name of the object
gradually appeared (linear ramping of transparency across 1000 𝑚𝑠) in front of the mask,
presented to both eyes. On Binocular trials, the image of the object gradually appeared in
front of the mask, presented to both eyes. On CFS trials, the image of the object gradually
appeared in front of the mask for the participant’s non-dominant eye, whereas the
dominant eye continued to view only masks.
Presentation of different images to the different eyes was accomplished by using
NVidia 3D “shutter” glasses, which synchronize with the display monitor to allow only
one eye to see through the glasses on a given refresh cycle; by alternating between two
displays on each refresh cycle, each eye views a different display. On all trials, once the
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object or word reached full opacity it was presented for 2500 𝑚𝑠, and then gradually
decreased to full transparency over 500 𝑚𝑠.
Throughout study trials, the Mondrian masks changed every 100 𝑚𝑠 (i.e., at
10 𝐻𝑧), by altering the position, size, and color of the rectangles in the mask. A set of
masks was randomly created for each participant, and this same set was used for all trials
for that participant, with each trial presenting the masks in the same order. Each 100 𝑚𝑠
duration mask was presented only once per trial.
At the start of each CFS study trial, participants were instructed to press a button
as soon as they detected that an object was present. They were instructed to give this
response only if they were confident that there was an object, but before they could
identify the object. As soon as they gave this response, the trial ceased so as to minimize
learning with awareness. To encourage fast responses, they were shown their reaction
time. To encourage accuracy, 1⁄3 of study trials were catch trials, in which no object
appeared. If they responded on catch trials, participants saw the message: “CAREFUL!
No object appeared”. This self-termination of study on CFS trials was included to: 1)
provide the maximum opportunity for learning with limited awareness; and 2) control the
degree of awareness. Regarding the second rationale, a fixed duration of study would
likely result in a mixture of trials, with some experiencing full “breakthrough” from CFS
and thus full awareness of object identity, while other trials would be completely without
any awareness that anything was shown. By allowing participants to self-terminate study
at the first stage of breakthrough (i.e., when they first started to become aware that an
object was present), the aim was to place all study trials at the same level of limited
awareness.
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At the start of Word trials, participants were instructed to “please imagine the
following object in detail, as if it were presented over the flashing squares.” At the start
of binocular trials, participants were instructed “please study the details of the following
object.”
At the end of every study trial for all study conditions, participants were asked
two questions about the object. First, they gave a four-valued Perceptual Awareness Scale
(PAS) (Ramsøy & Overgaard, 2004) rating, with values 0-3 (these data were collected
but analyses are not presented). Participants were instructed to use the scale as follows:
“If you CLEARLY SAW something besides the squares, AND COULD NAME IT,
answer 3”, “If you DEFINITELY saw something, but are unsure what (though you might
be able to guess), answer 2”, “If you only POSSIBLY saw something, but COULDN'T
accurately say what it was, answer 1”, and “If you didn’t see anything besides the
squares, answer 0.” These instructions were presented at the beginning of the experiment,
and a reminder was presented on all study trials. The second question was included to
encourage attention to the visual details of each object (in the word condition, the
imagined visual details of the object). The question was one of four randomly assigned
questions: 1) “Was the object symmetric across its horizontal axis?”, 2) “Did the object
fill more than 1⁄4 of the flashing squares?”, 3) “Was the object reflective?”, or 4) “Did
the object contain multiple parts?”

2.2.3.2 Test Phase
Each test phase occurred immediately after the corresponding study phase. The
test phase was self-paced, and the 16 items were presented in random order. On each test
trial, participants were first asked to choose which of two pairs of parts came from the
15

same object. Immediately after each 2AFC Part-matching test, the Naming test for the
corresponding object occurred (i.e., the two test formats were interleaved on a trial-bytrial basis). Specifically, the part that was common to both forced-choice options
reappeared by itself, and the participant was asked to name the corresponding object. In
both tasks, participants were encouraged to “use your memory from the items that you
studied, if that helps.”
For all participants, the first block was used as a practice. The practice block was
excluded from all analyses. The entire experiment lasted approximately 2 hours.

2.2.4 Analyses
State-trace analyses were the primary method to infer whether there was a
dissociation between lateral and vertical associations (Bamber, 1979; Dunn, 2008;
Kalish, Dunn, Burdakov, & Sysoev, 2016). State-trace analyses are motivated in the
following section and an overview of the mechanism is provided. Further details of statetrace analyses are presented in Part 2 of this thesis, as well as a novel technique for
performing a state-trace analysis.

2.2.4.1 Overview of State-Trace Analysis
The predicted pattern of results outlined above would constitute a double
dissociation (i.e., one manipulation selectively affects one performance measure, while a
different manipulation selectively affects a different performance measure). Such a
finding could provide evidence that lateral, intra-object associations can be learned
separately from top-down influence of object identity information. However, this
evidence would not be clear-cut – double dissociations can arise as an artifact of
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comparing two performance measures that differ in sensitivity to a single underlying
representation (Bamber, 1979; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Loftus, 1978; Newell & Dunn,
2008; Wagenmakers, Krypotos, Criss, & Iverson, 2012). That is, a double dissociation
does not decisively exclude the possibility that performance on both the 2AFC Partmatching and Naming tasks relies on a single type of memory representation (e.g., the
associations between visual parts and object identity).
To address this concern, a state-trace analysis was performed (e.g., Bamber, 1979;
Kalish et al., 2016). A state-trace analysis directly tests whether more than one latent
variable contributes to a given behavior, identifying dissociations in a manner that is not
rendered ambiguous by possible differences in task sensitivity. A state-trace analysis
frames the test in terms of an independent factor (e.g., 4 study conditions), two dependent
variables (e.g., implicit 2AFC versus explicit naming), and either one (e.g., memory
strength) or two (e.g., separate explicit and implicit object knowledge) latent
psychological variables of interest. The outcome space (Dunn, 2008, pg 429) is defined
as all possible combinations of values for the two dependent variables (in the current
case, the values are probabilities, so the outcome space is a unit square). The state-trace
(Dunn, 2008, pg 429) describes the subset of the outcome space that is feasibly reached
by a model that maps the independent factor via latent variables, into the outcome space.
The state-trace analysis asks whether the ordering of the average performance
across conditions is the same on each of the two measures. That is, can the observed data
be described by a single monotonic function, or does the ordering of performance on the
two conditions differ between measures? If the data can be fit with an arbitrary
monotonic function, then the data may have been produced by either a model with one or
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more latent variable (Ashby, 2014; Dunn, Kalish, & Newell, 2014). In that case, the data
do not provide explicit evidence for either kind of model, but parsimony could be
invoked to favor the simpler model. However, if the data cannot be fit with a monotonic
function, the unidimensional model may be rejected, lending credibility to the
bidimensional model.
A state-trace analysis technique developed by Kalish et al. (2016) was used to test
for a dissociation. Their procedure first finds the best-fitting, single-latent-variable
model. This model is defined such that performance on the two tasks (i.e., 2AFC Partmatching and Naming) depends on a single kind of representation (e.g., “memory
strength”). This definition is instantiated by a requirement that the rank ordering of the
estimated performance in all experimental conditions should be the same in both
dependent measures. This instantiation of the effect of a single latent variable (i.e.,
identical rank orderings of performance in both conditions) follows from an additional
assumption that the latent variable has a monotonic effect on performance. For example,
assume that performance on the two tasks depended on a single latent “memory
strength,” and that there were three conditions, 1, 2, and 3, that resulted in low, medium,
and high memory strength, respectively. Since performance depends only on the value of
the memory strength, it could not be the case that, for the first measure, performance in
condition 1 < 2 < 3 but for the second measure condition 1 < 3 < 2.
Next, the data are fit with a model that allows for different rank orders for each
dependent measure. This corresponds to the assumption of two or more latent variables
(e.g., two separate representations on which memory performance relies, such as lateral,
intra-item associations separate from top-down associations). Finally, the fits of these two
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models are compared using bootstrap resampling (Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, &
Iverson, 2004), which penalizes a model for being too flexible and thus fitting noise (in
this case, the single-latent-variable model is less flexible). If the single-variable model
results in a significant loss of fit, then a single-representation account of the data can be
rejected (Kalish et al., 2016), demonstrating a dissociation without concern over possible
differences in sensitivity of the two dependent measures.
Kalish et al. (2016) outlined statistical tests that can be performed on either the
participant-level average performance in each condition or a binomial version that can be
used to assess monotonicity within individual observers. Both tests exhibit tradeoffs. We
opted to analyze each observer’s average performance, which assumes only that
observers’ average performance within each condition on each task is normally
distributed.

2.2.4.2 Correction for Guessing
One potential concern with this experimental procedure is that performance for
objects that were studied with awareness (i.e., the word and binocular conditions) may
have artificially boosted naming performance as a result of a guessing strategy based on
explicit memory for the list of previously studied objects. That is, observers could adopt a
strategy whereby whenever they encountered an aperture that they did not recognize, they
simply guess from among the object names that they remembered studying.
To correct for this potential strategy, it was assumed that correct performance on a
given trial in the Naming task could arise either because the observer correctly identified
the whole object from the part using their memory (either from prior study or preexperimental perceptual knowledge), or correctly guessed the name. That is, the
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probability of naming an object on a given trial, 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒), was assumed to follow the
equation
𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒) = 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 ) + (1 − 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 )) ∗ (

𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 )⁄
4)

where 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 ) is the probability of naming the item using memory and
𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) is the probability of guessing an item from the most recent study list that
happened to come from the same study category (i.e. the same experimental condition) as
the correct name. Thus, in this equation, the 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) does not reflect overall
guessing rate but is instead the condition-specific guessing rate5. With this study
condition-specific definition, 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) is divided by 4 because for each test item,
there were exactly 4 items of that condition in the most recent study list (i.e., if memory
failed, participants had a one in four chance of guessing correctly if they only guessed
objects that were studied in the same condition as object they were trying to guess).
𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒) is the observed proportion of objects that were correctly named, but
𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 ) is the value of interest. 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) must had to be estimated.
To estimate 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) for each observer in each condition, we first tallied
the number of trials in which the observer provided neither the correct name, nor the
name of the partner object in the pair. Trials were excluded in which the partner object
was named because this name may have been prompted by the appearance of the partner

5

The condition-specific guessing rate was used instead of the overall guessing rate because this
supplementary analysis was only concerned about the extent to which guessing artificially increased
naming performance in some conditions but not others. That is, the concern is not that guessing occurred,
but that guessing may have helped more in some conditions as compared to others. For this reason, the
guess rate needed to be calculated in a condition-specific manner.
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object aperture in the 2AFC task that was immediately prior to the naming task (and so
including these trials would have biased the estimate of 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 )). Of these trials,
we determined the condition of the name that was provided. That is, we tallied the
number of times the produced incorrect name was the name of an object that was studied
as a Word on the most recent list, studied as a picture under CFS on the most recent list,
studied as a picture binocularly on the most recent list, one of the objects chosen for the
not studied condition on the most recent list, or was not on the list at all (e.g., from a
different list, or a random guess). Each of these values was divided by the total number of
error trials in the condition of interest (trials in which neither the correct name nor the
partner name were produced). Substitutions were categorized as coming from one of the
study conditions only if the name provided was from an object encountered during the
current block of 16 objects.
The resulting four rates (including only the substitutions with objects on the
current study list) provided an estimate of 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑔𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑠 ) for each condition. These
values were entered into the above equation, to derive values for 𝑃(𝑛𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑟𝑦 ).
Correcting for guessing did not change the conclusions of the state-trace analysis.

2.2.5 Results
To assess the effect of study condition on 2AFC Part-matching and Naming
performance, separate (i.e., one for 2AFC and one for Naming) linear mixed models were
fit using the lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) R (R Development Core
Team, 2016) package, treating condition as a fixed-effect and giving each participant a
random intercept (Figure 4). Post-hoc comparisons revealed that all pairwise comparisons
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were significantly different (all p < 0.05, Tukey's method for correcting multiple
comparisons), but that the Word and CFS conditions were reversed for the 2AFC Partmatching task relative to the Naming task. The average 2AFC Part-matching accuracy for
an object studied as a Word was 0.73 (SE = 0.014), which was lower than the average
2AFC accuracy for an object studied under CFS (M = 0.77, SE = 0.014; t(6728) = 2.868,
p = 0.022). In contrast, objects studied as words were more often named (M = 0.42, SE =
0.02) as compared to objects studied under CFS (M = 0.37, SE = 0.02; t(6728) = 3.221, p
= 0.007).
This dissociation between the effects of studying the identity of an object and
studying the visual details of an object suggests that the study conditions may have
allowed learning of two distinct kinds of information. Furthermore, these two distinct
kinds of information cannot be top-down (e.g., learned during Word study) versus
bottom-up (learned from visual study), because a benefit on the Part-matching task from
enhanced bottom-up processing, in the absence of lateral associations, can only be
revealed via the “top” (i.e., object identification, in which case Naming performance
would have been equally enhanced).
However, as mentioned above, these statistics are inherently ambiguous with
respect to inferring how many cognitive variables are required to account for the data
(Bamber, 1979; Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Newell & Dunn, 2008). For example, 50%
accuracy in the two tasks may imply different levels of performance (i.e., given that
chance in the 2AFC was 50%, but chance in the Naming task was presumably much
lower), or than an increase in 10% performance as compared to stimuli that were not
studied in the two tasks may imply different levels of learning. Therefore, a state-trace
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analysis was conducted to ask whether lateral, part-to-part associations were dissociable
from top-down associations between object identity and visual parts.
The technique developed by Kalish et al. (2016) was used to conduct a state-trace
analysis. In these data, the single-latent-variable model fit significantly worse (𝑝 =
0.0027; Figure 5), indicating that performance on the 2AFC Part-matching and Naming
tasks depended on more than one latent variable.

2.2.6 Discussion
This first experiment was designed to probe whether the learning of lateral
associations between visual parts of objects could be dissociated from the learning of
vertical associations. A state-trace analysis was used to determine whether performance
on the 2AFC Part-matching and Naming tasks could have depended on just a single latent
representation. The key result was whether performance could be accounted for by a
unidimensional model in a state-trace analysis. The unidimensional model was rejected
by the state-trace analysis technique developed by Kalish et al. (2016). This rejection
suggests that performance in the two tasks depended on more than a single latent
variable. Given the setup of the experiment, it is inferred that CFS provides a way to
preferentially boost the learning of intra-item associations as compared to part-whole
associations.
However, the state-trace analysis technique developed by Kalish et al. (2016)
does rely on a – possibly incorrect – assumption: that there is no trial-level correlation
between performance on the two tasks. Part 2 of this experiment will detail how
correlation between the two dependent measures could lead to an incorrect conclusion
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about the latent dimensionality of the cognitive system in question and provide a solution
based on a Bayesian mixture model of bivariate probits.
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CHAPTER 3
HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN STATE-TRACE ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction
The outline of this part is as follows. First, a reminder of key terminology of
State-Trace analyses will be presented, more detailed description of the theory of statetrace analysis will be presented. The method proposed in this thesis will follow. To
validate the technique, data were simulated from monotonic and non-monotonic models
and the technique was used to recover the data-generating model. The penultimate
section will apply the novel technique to the data collected in Part 1. A final section will
discuss a few remaining limitations to the technique.

3.2 Detail of State-Trace Analysis
State-trace analyses provide a way to test the dimensionality of psychological
spaces (Bamber, 1979; Dunn, 2008). A state-trace analysis frames a test in terms of an
independent factor (i.e., conditions), two dependent variables (e.g., accuracy in cuedrecall or recognition), and either one or two latent psychological variables of interest
(e.g., memory strength or attentional weight). The outcome space is defined as all
possible combinations that values of two dependent variables could take. The state-trace
describes the subset of the outcome space that is feasibly reached by a model that maps
an independent factor (i.e., experimental conditions) via latent variables, into the outcome
space. The goal of a state-trace analysis is to determine which model’s state-trace best
accounts for the observed state-trace – where ‘best’ is a measure of a model’s ability to
recapitulate the data at hand, penalized by its flexibility. This is analogous to most
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experiments, but the insight of a state-trace analysis is to frame the models in question in
a general enough way so that only their latent dimensionalities differ. That is, a statetrace analysis provides a way to make inferences on the dimensionality of the latent space
without precise specification of the transformation from latent to outcome space (Figure
6). Although the state-trace analysis can be performed on models with an arbitrarily sized
latent space, typically the models under comparison have either just one or two latent
dimensions. Comparisons between such unidimensional and bidimensional models will
be the focus of this paper.
Although models are only defined in terms of the dimensionality of the latent
variables, this relatively general definition enables the models in question to make
different, testable predictions. Specifically, the unidimensional model predicts that the
data as plotted in the outcome space will exhibit a monotonic relationship6. Hence, if the
data resemble a monotonic function, then the data may have been produced by either a
unidimensional or bidimensional model (Ashby, 2014; Dunn et al., 2014). However, if
the data cannot be fit with a monotonic function, the unidimensional model may be
rejected, lending credibility to a bidimensional model. In such a scenario, it is then up to
the researcher (analogously to the specification of an alternative hypothesis in nullhypothesis significance testing) to specify which bidimensional provides the most
plausible account of the data.

6

Note that this prediction only holds because of the relatively mild assumption that 𝑓 and 𝑔 (in both
models) are themselves monotonic. This translates to an assumption that, for example, if an increase a
latent variable like memory strength from low to medium elicits higher recognition accuracy, an increase in
memory strength from medium to high will not correspond to a decrease in performance on recognition.
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In the following explanation, an observed instance of the dependent variables will
be referred to as 𝑥 and 𝑦, respectively. Similarly, a value of the latent parameters 𝐴 and 𝐵
will be referred to as 𝑎 or 𝑏, respectively. The transformation of these latent variables
(the model) into outcomes will be written as functions, 𝑓 and 𝑔. In a unidimensional
model, outcomes are separate monotonic functions of a single latent variable
𝑥𝑢 = 𝑓𝑢 (𝑎),
𝑦𝑢 = 𝑔𝑢 (𝑏).
A hypothetical state-trace of a unidimensional model is plotted in Figure 6a.
In a bidimensional model (Figure 6b), the outcomes depend on two latent
variables. The resulting state-trace is defined by
𝑥𝑏 = 𝑓𝑏 (𝑎, 𝑏),
𝑦𝑏 = 𝑔𝑏 (𝑎, 𝑏).
One impediment to conducting State-Trace Analyses has been the lack of a
general solution for the practicalities of selecting between competing models; although
idealized models make different predictions for performance, the statistical tests that
should be used in the face of measurement noise remains an open question. That is,
although state-trace analyses provide a way to distinguish between models, the results of
an experiment are inevitably better described by
𝒙 ∼ 𝒇𝒖 (𝜽𝟏𝒖 ) 𝒙 ∼ 𝒇𝒃 (𝜽𝟏𝒃 )
𝒚 ∼ 𝒈𝒖 (𝜽𝟐𝒖 ) 𝒚 ∼ 𝒈𝒃 (𝜽𝟐𝒃 )
where 𝑓, 𝑔 are unspecified distributions with parameter vectors 𝜃 (indexed by
response, some (but not necessarily all) of whose elements will be functions of either 𝑎,
𝑏, or both), and the symbol, ∼, reads “is distributed as.” The challenge is in how to
determine the better fitting model when 𝑓 and 𝑔 are an unknown distribution.
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Methods for handling the noise inherent to experimentation have been proposed
(Bamber, 1979; Davis-Stober, Morey, Gretton, & Heathcote, 2016; Dunn & James, 2003;
Dunn & Kirsner, 1988; Kalish et al., 2016; Loftus, Oberg, & Dillon, 2004; Pratte &
Rouder, 2012; Prince, Brown, & Heathcote, 2012). Although these methods provide tools
to conduct a State-Trace Analysis, none of these methods provides a way to estimate
correlations of the condition effects between performance on the dependent measures.
These methods are based on the differences in expected performance in the two tasks, but
unmodeled correlations between the two measures could skew these differences (Figure
7). For example, on any given trial, the observer may decide to devote more effort to one
of the two tasks, with the choice of which task to favor varying from trial to trial, leading
to a negative dependency between the two measures. If a trial-level negative dependency
between task outcomes existed, the distributions of performance on the two conditions
may appear to lie on two separate state-traces. However, the underlying truth could be
that a single-state trace simply exhibits this negative correlation, and so the
unidimensional model is relatively handicapped. The problem in question, then, is how to
adjudicate between the following models
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∼ ℎ𝑢 (𝜃1 )
(𝑥, 𝑦) ∼ ℎ𝑏 (𝜃 2 )
which include the bivariate distributions ℎ𝑢 (for the univariate model) and ℎ𝑏 (for
the bivariate or multivariate model), not necessarily of the same form, that may have
different sets of parameters (𝜃1 vs. 𝜃 2 ) and whose dimensions may be correlated.
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3.3 Hierarchical Multivariate Probit Model for State-Trace Analysis
A graphical description of the style utilized by Kruschke (2014) is presented in
Figure 8. The 2AFC and Naming tasks were modeled with a hierarchical Bayesian,
bivariate probit model (Greene, 2017; Stan Development Team, 2017b). The model is
bivariate to reflect the two test questions (i.e., 2AFC and Naming). This bivariate probit
can be seen as a bivariate extension of an Equal Variance Signal Detection model in
which the criterions for both decisions have been fixed to 0 (Macmillan & Creelman,
2005). However, no specific cognitive interpretation is meant to be implied by the
dimensions of this regression model; the two dimensions should not be interpreted as two
separate kinds of, e.g., familiarity. Put another way, the model was not designed to
estimate the underlying latent variables that gave rise to behavior; both the
unidimensional model and bidimensional model rely on the bivariate probit because both
models need to account for performance in two tasks. Instead, the two dimensions of this
model can be thought of with the relatively atheoritic terms “evidence required to make a
correct response.”
However, intuitions for the mechanisms of a signal detection model are useful for
understanding the behavior of this bivariate probit model. The model assumes that
performance on the two tasks is a thresholded process whereby a participant will get a
correct response when the value of evidence, 𝑧, is above some threshold (fixed to 0).
Each pair of observations corresponds to a single trial, defined by a unique combination
of a participant, 𝑠 encountering an item, 𝑖, that was studied in condition, 𝑐. For example,
both 𝑧 above 0 corresponds to a trial in which the participant gets both tasks correct.
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The means of the data-generating distribution were the sum of item-, participant-,
and condition-effects. Intuitively, each of these effects can be thought of as their
respective propensity to elicit the correct response for each trial. For example, an itemeffect corresponds to the guessability of an item encountered in the 2AFC when it was
not studied condition and the nameability of that unstudied item in the Naming task
(given that the model is set up to treat the not-studied condition as a reference group).
Each item-, participant-, and condition-effect was sampled from bivariate normal
distributions. These bivariate normal distributions were each parameterized by a vector of
means describing the magnitude of the effects (𝜇), a correlation matrix describing the
correlation between the two effects (Ω), and standard deviation along each dimension (𝜏).
The means were fixed to 0. The item- and participant-effects were treated as random, and
the condition-effects were treated as fixed (Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Lee, 2011).
That is, all item- and participant-effects were sampled from two bivariate normal
distributions, representing the population distributions for item- and participant-effects,
respectively. Each of the four condition-effects were sampled from a separate bivariate
normal, allowing for trial-level positive or negative dependencies between the two
questions, with this dependence potentially differing between conditions. Non-centered
parameterizations of the bivariate normal for the item- and subject-effects were used
(Betancourt & Girolami, 2015).
Distributions at the top of the figure constitute the subjective hyperpriors for the
model. The correlation matrices were all given LKJ hyperpriors (Lewandowski,
Kurowicka, & Joe, 2009) (𝐿𝐾𝐽(1.5)), and the variance parameters were given gamma
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hyperpriors (Γ(2,4)). In total, the hyperpriors included three LKJ and three gamma
distributions.
To explain how to incorporate the monotonicity and non-monotonicity
constraints, it is useful to describe the assumed data-generating distribution as an
equation. The model specifies that outcome, 𝑦, on a given trial is modelled as a threshold
process
𝜇𝑥
𝑥
(𝑦)
= Φ2 ((𝜇 )
, Ω𝑐 )
𝑦 𝑐,𝑠,𝑖
𝑐,𝑠,𝑖
.
The function Φ2 is the cumulative distribution function of the standard bivariate
normal distribution (calculated as described by Greene, 2017), which serves to take the
unconstrained parameters 𝜇 into the range of 0-1 (corresponding to the likelihood of
either an incorrect or correct response). Although the standard deviations of the bivariate
normal implied by the function Φ2 are restricted to be one7, correlation between the two
dimensions is modelled through the matrix Ω𝑐 . A main parameter of interest is the effect
of each of the study conditions, which appears in the following equation
𝜇𝑐,𝑖,𝑠 = 𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑠 + 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑚_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡𝑖 + 𝛽𝑐
.
which says that each trial is the summation of subject 𝑠's ability, item 𝑖's
guessability, and the effect of condition 𝑐 (which is given the label 𝛽). That equation
would be repeated once to give both 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜇𝑦 .

7

Much like the common practice in a Signal Detection framework to specify that the distribution of
familiarity strengths has a standard deviation of 1, working with the cumulative density function of only the
standard bivariate normal does not sacrifice generality.
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The equations so far emphasize the data generating process, describing how the
model describes what happens on a given trial. To model the monotonic vs. nonmonotonic models, the following equation is useful, which implies the same model but
instead emphasizes the probability mass associated with a given observation
𝑥
𝑝 ((𝑦)

𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝜇𝑥
| (𝜇 )

𝑦 𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝑥
, Ω𝑐 ) = 𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡_𝑝𝑚𝑓 ((𝑦)

𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝜇𝑥
| (𝜇 )

𝑦 𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

, Ω𝑐 )

which shows that the model determines the likelihood of a trial based on a
bivariate probit distribution parameterized by a pair of means and a correlation matrix.
That is, the likelihood of an observation given the parameters of the model,
𝑥
𝑝 ((𝑦)

𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝜇𝑥
| (𝜇 )

𝑦 𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

, Ω𝑐 ), is a function of the bivariate probit probability mass function,

which is equivalent to Φ2 . Pairs of correct or incorrect responses (observations) are
modelled jointly by the bivariate probit.
In the model described so far, the condition-, subject-, and item-effects are all
unconstrained. This model is more flexible than either the monotonic and non-monotonic
models. To constrain the model requires imposing order constraints on the condition
effect, 𝛽. The different types of order constraints will imply either the monotonic or nonmonotonic models. For example, one monotonic model can be realized by requiring that
the condition parameters are in the following order: Not Studied < Word < CFS <
Binocular, for both the effect of 2AFC and Naming performance. A non-monotonic
model could be instantiated by enforcing the condition effect to have that order for the
2AFC task, but then enforcing the order of Not Studied < CFS < Naming < Binocular in
the Naming task. The dual challenges of both enforcing monotonicity and specifying all
monotonic or nonmonotonic orderings in single models is addressed next.
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Monotonicity is enforced using the method presented by Bürkner (2017). In each
dimension of 𝛽, a single parameter 𝛽 𝑟𝑎𝑤 models the direction and magnitude of the
direction and magnitude of the experimental manipulation. A separate parameter, 𝜁,
models the normalized distance between conditions
𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠

𝛽𝑐 = 𝛽 𝑟𝑎𝑤

∑

𝜁𝑖

𝑖=1

Note that there is a 𝜁 for each condition, and the 𝜁 for each condition is a vector.
Additionally, 𝜁 is required to be a simplex (i.e., requiring that 𝜁𝑖 ∈ [0,1] for all 𝑖 and
∑𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
𝜁𝑖 = 1). Any distribution capable of generating a simplex could be a
𝑖=1
suitable prior for 𝜁. In this case, a two-stage method is used8. First, 𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 − 1
intermediate parameters, 𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 , are sampled from a normal distribution
𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 ∼ 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜁 ),
once for each 𝜁 in each condition. The standard deviation of that normal
distribution, 𝜎𝜁 , controls the extent to which the prior prefers an equal mixture of
orderings as compared to preferring one single ordering9. Then, the 𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 are
concatenated with a single 0, and the resulting vector (which the following equation still
refers to as 𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 ) is transformed with the softmax function in the 𝜁 for a given condition
𝜁𝑐 =

exp(𝜁𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑤 )
∑𝑛_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
exp(𝜁𝑖𝑟𝑎𝑤 )
𝑖=1

8

The application of a softmax to intermediate parameters sampled from a normal distribution was chosen
rather than sampling from a Dirichlet for computational reasons. Initial attempts to sample 𝜃 directly from
a Dirichlet often resulted in highly autocorrelated samples of the 𝜆 parameter, and informal comparison
between use of the Dirichlet and the two-stage procedure suggested that the two-stage method resulting in
more efficient sampling.
9 In all uses of the model in this paper, the 𝜎𝜁 was set to 2.
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The softmax transforms the unbounded 𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 into a simplex. Note that one fewer
𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 are sampled as there are allowable orders in a model because the softmax function
is invariant to equal scaling of the inputs (e.g., softmax of the vector [1,1,1] is equal to
the softmax of the vector [2,2,2]). Without pinning one of the values of 𝜁 𝑟𝑎𝑤 , the 𝜁
parameter would be non-identifiable (e.g., pinning the first element of the previous
example gives the vectors [0,1,1] and [0,2,2], which when passed through the softmax
function produce different vectors).
To define a single, full monotonic model (which includes all sets of monotonic
orderings) and a single nonmonotonic model (which encompasses the monotonic
orderings), we follow (Davis-Stober et al., 2016) in using a mixture mixture-model
approach. The number of components in the mixture is therefore the 𝑚 ∗ 𝑘! possible
permutations, where 𝑘 = 4 is the number of conditions and 𝑚 = 1 in the monotonic case
and 𝑚 = 2 in the non-monotonic case.
The parameter 𝜆𝑗 is now introduced, whose interpretation is the probability that
the data were generated by condition effects with the order, 𝑗. Note that 𝜆 can be
interpreted as the probability of a given ordering being true, in that it is also a simple
(∑𝑛_𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠
𝜆𝑗 = 1). The likelihood of a given trial, incorporating all of the 𝑛_𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠 that
𝑗=1
are allowed by a given model is then
𝜇𝑥
𝑥
𝑃 ((𝑦)
| (𝜇 )
, Ω𝑐 ) =
𝑦 𝑐,𝑠,𝑖
𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝑛_𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠

∑

𝑥
𝜆𝑗 𝑏𝑖𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡_𝑝𝑚𝑓 ((𝑦)

𝑗=1

.
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𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

𝜇𝑥
| (𝜇 )

𝑦 𝑗,𝑐,𝑠,𝑖

, Ω𝑐 )

The preceding equation implies that the likelihood of the observed data is a
mixture (as weighted average) of as many bivariate probit probability mass functions as
there are orders under consideration. The components of the mixture are differentiated by
how their 𝜇 parameters were constructed (the order constraints put on the condition
effects). The weights associated with each ordering are now parameters to be estimated.
Put another way 𝜆 instantiates the uncertainty associated with the true order of condition
effects, and the variety of orders that are allowed by a given model. The same two-stage
approach that models the 𝜁 was used to model 𝜆.
Inference can then proceed through model comparison. Both the monotonic and
non-monotonic model are fit once (where the two models are differentiated based on the
orders of condition effects under consideration). Then, any suitable criterion for picking
the best fitting model can be used. In the present paper, Watanabe-Akaike Information
Criterion (WAIC) is chosen (Vehtari, Gelman, & Gabry, 2017; Watanabe, 2010;
Appendix B).
For computational reasons, one final adjustment was used in the simulations and
application below. That is, infeasible orderings were not included. In the particular case
of Experiment 1, it would be highly improbable for items encountered in the Not Studied
condition to be either named or chosen in the 2AFC more often than any of the other
conditions. Likewise, items that were studied Binocularly are surely the most likely to be
named and chosen correctly. As such, rather than considering, for example, 4! = 24
possible orderings in the monotonic model, the only orderings that are considered are
those in which 𝛽 for the Not Studied condition is lower than for the other three and 𝛽 for
the Binocular condition is higher than for the other three. This reduces the number of

35

orderings in the monotonic model from 24 to 2, and in the non-monotonic model from
48 to 4. This reduction in the number of orderings considered may also be justified from
a Bayesian perspective; the models considered express the strong prior belief that
studying an object in any of the three study conditions will never decrease task
performance, and that studying an image of object will full awareness enables more
learning than the other two study conditions.
All models were fit using the No-U-Turn Sampling algorithm as implemented by
the R interface to the Stan language (Stan Development Team, 2016, 2017a).

3.4 Model Recovery Via Simulation
To ensure the robustness of the proposed technique, it is beneficial to know that
the technique can recover the correct model in simulated data. That is, when the data are
generated from a monotonic model, the technique should pick the monotonic model.
When the data are generated from a non-monotonic model, the technique should pick the
non-monotonic model. This section provides a minimal validation of the technique, in
particular demonstrating the technique’s robustness to correlation between the two
measures.
To assess the robustness of the proposed technique to correlation between the two
measures, three pairs (one monotonic and one nonmonotonic) of datasets were simulated
with varied levels of correlation (Figure 9). Each pair consisted of a simulation from the
model described in the previous section, once for an ordering that could be explained by a
unidimensional model (which could therefore have also been produced by a bidimensional model) and once for an ordering that could be explained by a bi-dimensional
model (which could not have been produced by a unidimensional model). To probe how

36

the technique performs with data that are minimally, moderately, and highly correlated
the levels of correlations considered were 0, 0.5, and -0.9.
Each dataset included 50 participants presented with 40 items in each of 4
conditions (i.e., 8000 observations in total). The remaining parameters for the simulated
datasets were specified in the unconstrained space (i.e., as probit values). The condition
effects in the monotonic model were ((−1, −1), (−0.5, −0.5), (0.5,0.5), (1,1) ), and for
the non-monotonic model they were ((−1, −1), (−0.5,0.5), (0.5, −0.5), (1,1) ). The
variability of participant and item effects was set to 0.5 probits (i.e., participant and item
effects were sampled from a bivariate normal distribution with no correlation and
standard deviation of 0.5 along both dimensions). These parameters produced data from
each condition that was highly overlapping (Figure 9).
In all six comparisons, the correct model was chosen by more than 3 standard
errors (Appendix B). This is encouraging, as it suggests that the technique can pick the
correct model given sufficient power.
To explore the limits of the technique, additional smaller datasets were simulated
that included that had 1) only three conditions, 2) only 20 items per condition, 3) either
10, 20, or 30 participants, 4) correlations of -0.5, 0, or 0.5, 5) nine different arrangements
of condition effects spanning from monotonic to minimally nonmonotonic, and 6) the
nonmonotonic model was divided into two model – a “full” model that contained both
monotonic and nonmonotonic orderings and a true nonmonotonic model that did not
contain monotonic orderings (the monotonic model was also fit to these datasets,
resulting in three fits per dataset). However, the WAIC was equivocal in most of these
comparisons. That is, the difference in the WAIC for most of these comparisons was less
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than 2 standard errors. This is, of course, the desired response when the data were
monotonic. However, it does suggest that the technique may require many observations
to have the power to detect to nonmonotonicity, depending on the degree of monotonicity
and the variability due to items or participants.

3.5 State-Trace Analysis Applied to Experiment 1
Applying this novel technique to the results from experiment 1, 6 chains were run,
with 1000 samples of warmup and an additional 1000 samples from the posterior (6000
posterior samples, overall). The 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ for all parameters in both models was below
1.1 and there were no divergent transitions (Appendix A; Betancourt, 2017; Betancourt &
Girolami, 2015; Gelman, 2014; Gelman & Rubin, 1992).
The monotonic and non-monotonic models were fit to the data and model fits
were compared via WAIC (Vehtari et al., 2017; Watanabe, 2010). WAIC was calculated
using the log-likelihood of all 6000 samples from the posterior samples. The nonmonotonic model (𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 10 -7882.3, 𝑠𝑒 44.4) was preferred to the monotonic model
(𝑒𝑝𝑙𝑑𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 -7890.4, 𝑠𝑒 44.4), with a difference of 2.31 standard errors (𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓 8.1, 𝑠𝑒
3.5). Thus, this proposed technique corroborates the conclusions of Part 1 and suggests
that participants were relying on intra-item associations—associations that were distinct
from the top-down influence of verbal representations of object identity.
The primary concern that prompted the introduction of a novel analysis technique
was that the presently available methods did not account for the potential for trial-level
correlations between the two measures to influence the conclusion drawn from the state

10

See Appendix B for an overview of the WAIC and its use in model comparison
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trace analysis. We pointed out that unmodeled negative correlation could bias a STA to
falsely reject the unidimensional model. One advantage of the proposed technique is not
only the removal of this bias, but also that the correlation can be estimated. In our data, it
appears that there was a positive correlation between the two measures.

3.6 Remaining Shortcomings
One challenging limitation of this technique is computational. On a modern
computer (24 GB Ram, 2.60 GHz) in which it was possible to run 6 Markov Chains in
parallel, running the model on a simulated dataset of 8000 observations in which each
individual chain had a 1000 sample warm-up and a 500-sample draw from the posterior
required approximately 13 hours to finish. Fitting both the monotonic and non-monotonic
model therefore required around 26 hours. In comparison, the technique of Kalish et al.
(2016) required only a few seconds. Although the slow speed is acceptable when only
one comparison between a monotonic and non-monotonic model is required, this makes
it challenging to efficiently explore models from closely related families (e.g., some
datasets may warrant interaction effects between condition and participants or condition
and items). Likewise, designs that involve more than four conditions are expected to run
even slower (given that more possible mixtures or orders may be possible). This latter
example is unfortunate, given that additional conditions usually benefits a state-trace
analysis by sampling more points along the state-trace in question.
A second shortcoming is that it will be important to better understand how this
method handles participants with heterogeneous state-traces. That is, although the model
estimates item- and subject-effects, it is not flexible enough to simultaneously model a
group of participants that have both monotonic and non-monotonic state-traces (i.e., it
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assumes that there is just a single, true ordering). In the context in which some
participants exhibit a monotonic state-trace and other exhibit a non-monotonic state trace,
it would be convenient to have a rough estimation on the power to detect those
participants that exhibit evidence for the non-monotonic model. This unknown is
intimately related to the first challenge, in that the full exploration of parameter space of
possible orderings (i.e., 0% of participants exhibit a non-monotonic model up to 100% of
participants exhibit non-monotonicity, in combination with number of participants and
number of trials per condition) would require weeks to complete. This is currently under
exploration.

3.6 Discussion
A state-trace analysis is a powerful, relatively non-parametric way to distinguish
between models that differ in terms of latent dimensionality. However, despite its nonparametricity, the current approaches for implementing an STA are not assumption free.
Specifically, current approaches assume functional independence between the two
measures. It is shown here that this assumption of functional independence can be relaxed
by exchanging it for the assumption that a hierarchical bivariate probit provides an
adequate description of the data.
It is worth clarifying which parts of the STA technique introduced here are
essential to the technique. The primary contribution of this technique is to demonstrate a
method for instantiating uncertainty in the tonicity of condition effects while
simultaneously modelling the correlation between measures that could take binary values.
Uncertainty in the tonicity is instantiated as a mixture model of many possible orderings,
and the correlations between measures are modelled by using a bivariate distribution.
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Other details are nonessential. For example, the model was fit using Stan’s No-U-Turn
Sampler algorithm, but any suitably robust algorithm could have been applied. Similarly,
model evaluation proceeded via comparison of WAIC. However, other measures might
be more appropriate in other circumstances (Piironen & Vehtari, 2017; Vehtari et al.,
2017). Parameters were modelled in a hierarchical setting to model variance due to item
and subject effects, but the technique could be used with a shallower model. Finally, even
the choice of a bivariate probit is nonessential. The bivariate probit distribution was
chosen for its relationship to signal detection theory, but in principal other distributions
that provide a reasonable description of the data could be utilized.
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CHAPTER 4
VISUAL RECOLLECTION

4.1 Introduction
The primary question of this thesis is whether visual recollection can occur
without mediation by episodic recollection. Part 1 presented an experiment that appeared
to dissociate lateral, intra-item associations from vertical, visual part-verbal identity
associations. In Part 2, a novel state-trace analysis was discussed that were able to reject
the interpretation that the results of Part 1 were an incorrect by-product of unmodeled
correlations between task performance. This final part utilizes the study paradigm of Part
1 and asks whether participants can utilize lateral associations to perform visual
recollection.
A visual recollective account needs to be distinguished from a compound cue
account. Compound cue accounts were initially proposed as an alternative to spreadingactivation accounts of the influence of multiple cues on recognition tasks (Dosher &
Rosedale, 1989, 1997; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1988). Briefly, a spreading-activation
mechanism specifies that presentation of a prime results in the activation of
representations that are related to the cues (e.g., via prior study). To the extent that a
subsequently presented target is strongly associated with the cues, that target will have
been “pre-activated” and processing of it can proceed either more quickly or more
accurately. In contrast, a compound-cue mechanism functions without any pre-activation,
but instead claims that multiple cues can interact to give a familiarity signal that is more
informative than the sum of the familiarity signals from of the individual cues. The PartMatching task from Part 1 in this thesis is an example of a recognition task involving
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multiple cues, and the process of visual recollection would be analogous to a spreading
activation account.
Two kinds of compound-cue mechanisms have been proposed. In the mechanism
specified by Ratcliff & McKoon (1988), individual cues are combined super-additively,
such that the familiarity signals from the cues combined by some function like
multiplication (i.e., if the two items A and B are studied together and then A is used as a
prime to the target B, participants’ response for B will be based not only on their
familiarity for A and their familiarity for B, but also the result of e.g. A*B). In a related
account proposed by Dosher & Rosedale (1989), the component cues are stored in a
composite (i.e., conjunctive) representation, and the enhancement in performance is
through the additional familiarity signal conferred by this composite representation (i.e.,
if the three items A, B, and C are studied together and A are B as provided as cues at test,
participants have a familiarity signal that is the familiarity of A + the familiarity of B +
the familiarity of AB). The key to these compound-cue mechanisms is that multiple cues
can interact in a super-additive way (e.g., either via a multiplicative operation
performance on the cues or via storage of conjunctive whole) to provide a boost to
familiarity which participants can use in a recognition task, and that this boost can occur
without needing to propose that activation spreads to related targets.
To ask whether visual recollection can occur, an experiment was needed that can
distinguish between a recollective versus a compound cue account. Although experiment
1 demonstrated that participants can learn intra-item associations, it does not speak
directly as to how those associations were used during 2AFC. Under the visual
recollection account, successful performance in the 2AFC would be contingent on
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participants’ ability to pattern-complete the remainder of the cued items. Patterncompletion on the matching pair would have produced (at least parts of) a single (correct)
object, whereas pattern-completion of the mismatching pairs would have produced two
conflicting images. Under the compound-cue account, the two matching cues would have
simply interacted super-additively, and participants could have chosen the correct pair
based on the higher familiarity signal induced by those matching parts.
To distinguish between a visual recollection and a compound-cue account
requires a task in which participants must actively engage in pattern-completion in even
the presence of a single cue (Figure 10). Experiment 2 achieved this with a speeded,
perceptual detection task. Participants studied lists of images of objects, in which the
objects were presented either binocularly or masked by CFS. At test, participants first
engaged in the same cued-recall task as in Experiment 1 (Figure 10a). Then, immediately
after the cued-recall, participants engaged in a go/no-go task (Figure 10b). In the
perceptual detection task, the inverse of the cue, a “bullet-hole” stimulus appeared out of
visual white noise. Participants were instructed to respond as soon as they were sure that
an object was appearing from the noise. On some trials, no object appeared, and so
participants’ job was to wait the duration of the trial without responding. The object that
appeared was always the bullet-hole that matched the cue.
Recollection and compound-cue accounts make contrasting predictions for the
effect of a cue from a studied object on participants’ response time (RT) distribution.
Specifically, only a recollection account predicts that the leading-edge of the RT will
shift earlier in time when the cue is from an object that was studied. This prediction of the
recollection account follows from the assumption that, if the cue prompts a recollective
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process, many of the visual details of the object that subsequently emerges out of the
noise will have already been retrieved; the cue will enable a (perhaps implicit and
incomplete) “preview” of upcoming the bullet-hole stimulus. The fastest response times
on go trials should therefore be even faster when visual recollection has occurred, and the
leading edge of the RT distribution would therefore be shifted earlier in time. In contrast,
the compound-cue account would not predict an effect of study on the leading-edge. This
lack of a leading-edge effect under the compound cue account follows from the
assumption that the compound representation is not sufficiently activated by the single
object part. That is, this prediction follows from the assumption that aperture parts do not
provide a sufficient enough set of associates activate a substantial compound; for the
compound cue to take effect and enable faster perception of the emerging object, the
object must have already sufficiently emerged from the noise. Hence, the compound cue
account would not predict that the fastest response times get faster with study.
The visual recollection account additionally predicts that the leading-edge effect
should occur for objects that have been encoded primarily as lateral associations between
intra-item features – encoded with minimal associations between the parts of the object
and the identity of the object. That is, the extent to which the leading-edge effect occurs
as a result of visual recollection as compared to episodic recollection is the extent to
which the leading-edge effect occurs even when participants are unable to name the
object when given the cue. To distinguish between a visual and episodic recollective
mechanism, participants in this experiment studied objects either Binocularly or as
masked by CFS. Given that the first experiment suggested that study of images of object
that are masked by CFS preferentially enables participants to form intra-item associations
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as compared to part-whole associations, the key result in this experiment was whether
items that are studied under CFS and are not named produce a shift in the leading-edge of
the RT distribution.

4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Participants
60 new participants were sought for this experiment. Four participants were
excluded on the basis that they did not provide any responses to the cued-recall trials. An
additional four participants were recruited to replace the excluded participants. In total 64
participants were run, but the data from only 60 are reported on. All participants were
recruited from the University of Massachusetts undergraduate psychology program via
SONA, and the local Amherst community. Participants received either course credit or
monetary compensation (5$ minimum, with an additional 5$ for each 20 minutes of
experimentation). Participants had either normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All
participants provided written consent prior to participating in the experiment.
120 of the objects from experiment 1 were used. For each object, the cue in the
cued-recall task was the same as in Experiment 1. Additionally, a single “bullet-hole”
stimulus was constructed out of each object, which was the inverse of the cue. That is, the
bullet-hole stimulus was the entire object image, excluding the circular aperture that was
used as a cue. Objects were divided into 10 lists of 12 objects each.
Experiment 2 involved two additional calibration phases not present in
Experiment 1. The first calibration phase was designed to test ocular dominance. In this
phase, black arrows pointing to either the left or the right were presented on the screen.
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The second phase was designed to calibrate the duration of time before participants
would notice objects emerging from the noise. For this phase, an additional 32, grayscaled images of unique, different objects were utilized. These objects were of the same
size as were used in the primary experiment.

4.2.2 Procedure
4.2.2.1 Ocular Dominance
Ocular dominance for each participant was assessed using the technique
introduced by Yang, Blake, & McDonald (2010). Across 100 trials, participants were
asked to indicate the direction (either left or right) of an arrow presented centrally and
masked by CFS. Each trial began with a fixation cross overlaid on the Mondrian mask
was presented for a uniformly random duration between 400 to 600 𝑚𝑠. Following
fixation, the arrow began to emerge out of the mask. On half of the trials (randomly
intermixed), the arrow was presented to the left eye, and on the other half it was
presented to the right. For each participant, direction of the arrow was counterbalanced
with the eye it was presented to. The transparency of the arrow increased by 1% every
100 𝑚𝑠 (in whichever eye it was being presented to).
Participants’ dominant eye was chosen as the one for which, when the arrow was
presented to this eye, participants’ average response time was fastest. Objects that were
masked by CFS in subsequent phases were only presented to the non-dominant eye.

4.2.2.2 Opacity Calibration
Prior to the main experiment, an adaptive procedure was used to calibrate the
maximum opacity at which to present an object during CFS. Each trial began with

47

presentation of the CFS mask to both eyes. After a variable onset, the object was
presented to the non-dominant eye at a 4% opacity (i.e., mostly transparent). The opacity
of the object then increased linearly, up to a maximum value (defined below). The object
remained at that maximum opacity until the final second of the trial, at which point it
linearly decreased down to 0%. During these trials, participants were instructed to press
‘Enter’ on a keyboard to indicate when they first notice that an item has appeared.
After the presentation of each object, participants provided a PAS rating (Ramsøy
& Overgaard, 2004). When participants provided a PAS rating of 3, they were instructed
to respond more quickly, before the object had been identified. Similarly, when
participants provided PAS ratings of 1, they were instructed to wait until they were sure
that an item has appeared. To encourage participants to wait until they were sure that an
item has appeared, 30% of all trials were “catch trials” in which no object emerged.
Participants were given the same instructions on these catch trials as on the CFS trials:
press ‘Enter’ when they first notice that an item has appeared. If participants mistakenly
responded on catch trials, they received a warning that no object was present and
reminded of the instructions that they should wait until they are sure that an item was
appearing before responding. To encourage participants to respond as soon as they
noticed an object, participants were informed of their reaction time by displaying it on the
screen after participants provided the PAS rating —as well as whether an object was
present.
The opacity required for 90% of the items to be noticed but not identified (i.e., to
which a participant should provide a PAS rating of 2) after 3 seconds was estimated from
these data.
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4.2.2.3 Main Experiment
The main phase of Experiment 2 consisted of nine blocks each consisting of a
study and test phase. During study phases, objects were presented for study under either
CFS or Binocular viewing. Eight objects were studied in each study phase, four in each
of the two study conditions. Presentation of the objects in the CFS condition proceeded as
in the calibration phase of Experiment 1, with the maximum opacity continuously
updated. Objects were presented twice, with the second presentation occurring only after
all objects had been presented once. For the second presentation, the objects were
presented in the same order as the first. As in the calibration phase, participants were
instructed to indicate when they notice an object appearing during CFS trials (i.e., to selfterminate CFS trials when they could provide a PAS rating of 2, but no later), they were
informed of their reaction time, and 30% of study phase trials were catch trials.
During test phases, participants encountered each object in the block on one test
trial, in a randomized order. There were 12 items per test phase, the 8 items that were
studied and 4 objects that were Not Studied. Conditions were counterbalanced across
participants, but the same 12 items were always presented in the same list. On each test
trial, participants were first required to perform the Naming (i.e., cued-recall) task from
Experiment 1. They were encouraged to use their memory of objects they encountered
from the study phase if they thought it would help. No feedback was provided. After
participants provided a response, the aperture cue disappeared and was replaced by visual
white noise. On 3/4 of test trials (3 out of the 4 objects from each study condition, or 9
trials per list), after 400 − 600 𝑚𝑠 of white visual noise (randomly sampled from a
uniform distribution), a matching bullet-hole stimulus gradually emerged out of the noise.
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Participants were instructed to press a key as soon as they were sure that an object was
emerging from the noise, but to not respond if no object emerged. The emergence was
accomplished by linearly increasing the opacity of the bullet-hole stimulus, from 0% to
100% over four seconds, remaining at 100% opacity until either a participant responded
or 10 seconds since the beginning of the emergence had passed. On the other fourth of
test trials, no object emerged so participants were therefore required to wait without
responding for 10 seconds. When participants responded while the object was emerging
from the noise, they were shown their reaction time. When no object was present (i.e., if
participants responded before the variable onset or on a no-go trial) they were warned
that no object was presented and given a reminder that they should only respond when
they are sure that an object was appearing.

4.3 Analyses
The primary questions were how the leading-edge of the RT distribution on go
trials was influenced by study and whether a participant could correctly identify the
object. Estimates of the minimum value of a distribution will be highly sensitive to noise.
Rather than attempting to trim improbably fast responses (i.e., responses made in error
before sufficient evidence had been gathered to make an informed decision – a
designation that is difficult to make), two methods were chosen to analyze the leadingedge that would be relatively robust to noise.
First, a quintile analysis was performed on the RT distribution. A Linear Mixed
Effects model was used that included a random intercept for both subjects and items, as
well as fixed-effect intercepts (with all 2-way interactions and the 3-way interaction) for
Condition (2 levels: Binocular and CFS), Percentile (5 levels: the quintiles of the RT
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distribution), and Naming Accuracy (2 levels: correct and incorrect). Note that, by
design, RTs in different quintiles are not independently distributed. However, the speedup elicited by study can be assumed to be independent across quintiles. To account for
this, this analysis was conducted on differences in RT as compared to the baseline of Not
Studied. That is, the data entered into the model were not the percentiles from each of the
three conditions but were instead the difference between the Not Studied Condition and
either the Binocular or CFS condition. Analyzing differences maintains the independently
distributed assumption of regression. The R packages lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) and
emmeans (Lenth, Love, & Herve, 2018) were used for this analysis.
Although the quintile analysis provides a robust and relatively simple way to
estimate the leading-edge, there are at least two ways in which the analysis could be
augmented. First, the choice of percentiles to analyze is somewhat arbitrary. That is, there
is little theoretical reason to prefer five percentiles instead of, e.g., four or six, each of
which could also provide an estimate of the leading edge. Second, it would be beneficial
for the estimate of the effect of one quintile to inform the estimate of the effect of the
other quintiles. That is, by treating the quintiles simply as levels of a factor, the analysis
does not leverage any of the wealth of information known about RT distributions.
The second analysis was designed to complement the quintile analysis. Here, the
parameters of an exponentially-modified Gaussian (ex-Gaussian) distribution were fit to
the data to summarize the key differences in the RT distributions. The ex-Gaussian is a
three-parameter distribution, whose probability density function is given by the
convolution of the probability density functions of an exponential and Gaussian
distribution. One parameter corresponds to the scale parameter of the exponential, the
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other two are the mean (i.e., location of the peak) and standard-deviation of the Gaussian
component. Attempts have been made to link the parameters of the ex-Gaussian to latent
cognitive processes, but the utility of such endeavors has been criticized (Matzke &
Wagenmakers, 2009; Van Zandt, 2000). Still, the ex-Gaussian describes response time
distributions well (Heathcote, Popiel, & Mewhort, 1991) and is used here to assess how
the distributions differ across the conditions in order to test the a priori predictions, while
remaining agnostic about whether the parameters correspond to particular cognitive
processes. The parameters of the ex-Gaussian were fit in a hierarchical Bayesian
framework. The peak location parameter of the Gaussian component was modelled with a
random intercept for each participant and item, as well as an intercept and interaction for
the study condition (3 levels) and intercept for whether the cue was correctly identified (2
levels). The scale and standard deviation parameters were allowed to vary according to
whether participants correctly identified the object from the cue11. The model was fit
using Stan and the brms package (Bürkner, 2017; Stan Development Team, 2017b).

4.4 Results
Participants largely followed instructions in both the study and test phases (Figure
11). During the study phases, participants provided predominantly PAS responses of
either 2 or 3 during CFS trials (Figure 11a). Study improved cued-recall accuracy (Figure

11

A few other, closely related models were considered. For example, models were considered in which the
standard deviation or scale parameter was also allowed to vary by Condition, and with the interaction of
Condition and whether the cue was correctly identified. Of the models considered, the one described in the
main text fit the data best (as determined by WAIC). A comparison of all possible models – in which all
possible permutations of condition, naming, participant, and item effects are considered for each of the
three parameters – was not conducted given that the recommended use of WAIC is for adjudication
between only a few, best models to avoid a selection induced bias (Vehtari et al., 2017).
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11b)12, largely replicating the trends of Experiment 1. Finally, go/no-go accuracy was
almost perfect (Figure 11c); participants almost always responded when there was an
object present and rarely responded when an object was absent.
The leading-edge of the RT distribution is the main observation of interest.
Linear-mixed effects analysis revealed that the 20th percentile of response times for
objects studied under CFS and not named were faster than those that were Not Studied
and not named (Figure 12; compare leftmost orange datum to leftmost blue datum, in left
panel).
In the fits of the ex-Gaussian distribution, four chains were used, each with 1000
warmup samples and 1250 samples from the posterior. All 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ were under 1.1 and
there were no divergent transitions (Appendix A). Overall, the model appeared to have
converged.
The main result of interest from this model is the posterior distribution for the
effect of CFS-study on the mean component of the gaussian (as compared to Not Studied)
when items were unnamed. That is, to what extent is the RT distribution shifted for items
that were studied under CFS but not named? In the model, the 95% highest density
interval of the difference in posteriors for the effect of CFS-study on the mean component
of the gaussian from the effect of Not Studied when items were unnamed was below 0
(Figure 13). This corroborates the quintile analysis, suggesting that the entire RT

12

Although cued-recall was overall lower in Experiment 2, there are at least two experimental design
differences that may have lead to this. First, in Experiment 1 participants were asked questions about the
studied objects to encourage learning. No such questions were asked during Experiment 2. Second, in
Experiment 1, the 2AFC preceded the cued-recall. Although no feedback was provided after the 2AFC,
participants effectively received additional cues in Experiment 1, as compared to Experiment 2.
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distribution – including the leading-edge – was faster for items that were studied under
CFS, even when those items were not named.

4.5 Discussion
In Experiment 2, it was asked whether recollection could proceed for nonepisodic memories. Visual recollection was measured via a perceptual detection task that
a followed cued-recall task. It was hypothesized that, if participants were able to engage
in visual recollection, the aperture cue in the cued-recall task would have enabled
retrieval of the visual details of the whole object. Those visual details would be the same
details as subsequently emerge from the noise in the detection task. The extent to which
participants’ fastest RTs were faster after study would indicate the extent to which study
enabled them to preview the bullet-hole stimulus. Importantly, for visual recollection to
have occurred (as compared to episodic recollection), this leading-edge effect should
have occurred even for objects that were studied under CFS, and even when participants
could not retrieve the name of the object at study. These predictions of a visual
recollection account were observed, suggesting that participants could engage in a
recollection process for low-level, non-declarative representations.
Two features of the results are interesting to note. First, the leading-edge effect
was large (Figure 12; compare the orange to either the blue or green lines in either panel).
This was most likely brought about by the slow rate at which the bullet-hole stimulus
emerged from the noise. The slow emergence of the stimulus was chosen to enable a
larger window in which visual recollection could affect perception.
Second, although the earliest response times were faster for studied items that
were both not-named and named, the shape of the RT distribution appeared to change
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only for objects that were studied and named (Figure 12; compare left and right panels).
That is, the data indicate that correct retrieval of the object’s identity happened in concert
with an additional process that affected RT in the perceptual detection task. One
speculative account is that the change in shape is the result of recollection of features
located further along the hierarchy of representations for object (i.e., episodic or “whole
object” representations, rather than visual representations of object components). Under
this proposal, the named cues lead to the generation of both low-level visual material, but
also recurrent retrieval of visual details that were associated with the name of the object.
The more associations that participants have learned (lateral and vertical), the more
retrieval could compound. This effect would have been observed primarily on trials in
which participants could name the cue because it was only on these trials that the
recurrence had been initiated prior to perception of the object. That is, this speculation is
largely just suggesting that the possible change in the shape of the RT that was observed
for named cues (of objects that were studied) is a function of a larger amount of pattern
completion (as compared to just visual recollection).
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CHAPTER 5
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This thesis asked whether participants could recollect intra-item associations
between the low-level visual features of objects that they were largely unaware of
studying and were unable to identify at test. Part 1 presented Experiment 1, which
dissociated the learning and retrieval of intra-item associations from part-to-object-label
associations. The dissociation relied on a STA, however the currently available methods
for conducting a STA ignore potential correlations between the dependent measures. In
Part 2, a novel STA technique was introduced that explicitly models the correlations.
Model comparison suggested that the results of experiment 1 were not a result of
unmodeled dependencies between the two tasks. Together, Parts 1 and 2 established that
associations between intra-item features can be learned separately from part-to-verballabel associations. However, they could not distinguish between a visual recollection
account of the memory retrieval process and a compound cue account. In Part 3,
Experiment 2 was presented. In experiment 2, the speed of perception for missing intraitem associates following a cued-recall task was measured. RT distributional analyses
revealed a shift in the leading edge of the RT distribution for objects that were studied
with minimal awareness, even when those objects were not named. This shift in the
leading edge was interpreted as indicating that the cued-recall task enabled participants to
preview the upcoming bullet-hole stimulus before it emerged from the noise. That is, it
the cued-recall task appears to have enabled participants to engage in visual recollection.
The RH account of memory predicted that recollection can support the production
of arbitrary and novel associations between low-level associates. These behavioral
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studies were therefore largely confirmatory hypothesis testing. However, progress in
science ultimately requires falsification of theories. That is, understanding recollection
and, more broadly, the relationship between mnemonic processes and representations,
requires not only verifying that the predictions of one theory are not incorrect, but also
that the predictions of competing theories are incorrect. Many theories that compete with
the RH account do so at a neurocomputational level. At that level, the question is whether
certain mnemonic processes are linked to particular brain regions. The RH account
claims that mnemonic processes are not tied to specific brain regions (i.e., a process like
recollection can occur throughout the MTL and the ventral visual stream). In contrast,
“process-based” theories claim that particular mnemonic functions can only be performed
by particular brain regions, e.g., that the hippocampus is responsible for recollection
whereas the rhinal cortices are responsible for familiarity (Aggleton & Brown, 2006;
McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995; Montaldi & Mayes, 2010; Norman &
O’Reilly, 2003; Squire & Dede, 2015; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). Other “hybrid”
theories exist between these two extremes, e.g., claiming that the hippocampus performs
domain general associations whereas regions like the perirhinal cortex are primarily
responsible for representing objects (Hannula, Libby, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2013;
Wang, Yonelinas, & Ranganath, 2013). What do the behavioral studies in this thesis offer
this neurocomputational debate?
The behavioral studies in this thesis complement prior neuroimaging experiments
that have demonstrated that expectation can lead to the pre-activation of sensory
information about the expected stimulus. Even when the cue is a relatively simple
stimulus (e.g., textural fractal patterns, a tone), associated visual information (e.g., an
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orientation) can be reinstated in cortex (Ekman, Kok, & de Lange, 2017; Hindy, Ng, &
Turk-Browne, 2016; Kok, Failing, & de Lange, 2014). However, those studies have used
associations across time (Ekman et al., 2017; Hindy et al., 2016), or across different
sensory modalities (Kok et al., 2014; Kok, Mostert, & de Lange, 2017). Across many
theories, this kind of highly associative information (across contexts or modalities) is
often claimed to require the hippocampus (Clark & Maguire, 2016). However, the results
of this thesis suggest that, even if these experiments could be replicated so as to not
require such highly complex associations (e.g., only intra-object features), low-level
cortical reinstatement may still be observable. Of the three kinds of accounts of memory,
only the RH account clearly makes that prediction of a visual recollective process in lowlevel cortex.
However, Henke and colleagues have provided evidence that associative
information can be learned implicitly (Henke, 2010; Reber & Henke, 2011; Reber,
Luechinger, Boesiger, & Henke, 2012). In their neuroimaging work, the hippocampus
appears to be critical for the formation of those associations. Indeed, it has been claimed
that the hippocampus will always function to drive or initiate a pre-activation signal
(Bosch, Jehee, Fernandez, & Doeller, 2014; Danker, Tompary, & Davachi, 2016; Hindy
et al., 2016). Such a link between a cognitive process and an anatomical structure is
inherently process-based and contends with the neurocomputational assumptions of the
RH account. One study notes that many neuroimaging studies (and studies of recollection
more generally) are often confounded by stimulus type, in that demonstrations of a link
between recollection and the hippocampus tend to test only a certain class of stimuli – the
representations of which likely require the involvement of the hippocampus (Ross, Sadil,
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Wilson, & Cowell, 2017). After removing this confound, Ross et al. observed a
recollective process that appeared to occur independently of the hippocampus. Indeed, at
least one other recent theory posits that the involvement of the hippocampus – in a
variety of cognitive processes – will be contingent on the representations required to
perform the task at hand (Yonelinas, 2013). Elucidating the representations that are
required for a given task and better understanding which anatomical structures are
responsible for those representations will provide valuable data to further adjudicate
between these competing accounts.
A brief note about the representations involved in this task, and those that are
suppressed by CFS, is worth discussing. In the present experiments, intra-item parts were
chosen subjectively. Similarly, CFS was chosen as a relatively coarse way to manipulate
whether participants were able to learn higher-level representations. “Intra-item features”
and “higher-level representations” are necessarily imprecise; it is not currently possible to
quantitatively predict for an arbitrary visual stimulus which representations or
associations participants have access to during study under CFS, nor which they utilize
during visual recollection. However, some trends are taking shape in the CFS literature
that the relationship of the visual properties of the mask and the masked image influence
the efficacy of CFS. For example, CFS is more effective when the mask and masked
image share spatial frequencies and cardinal orientations (Yang & Blake, 2012).
Similarly, overlap between mid-level (i.e., representations that are not held in V1)
prevents participants awareness of the masked images for longer durations (Cohen,
Nakayama, Konkle, Stantić, & Alvarez, 2015). However, a systematic review of the
comparison of how shared features between the masked and the masking stimuli
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influence the duration of suppression is impeded the wide variety and non-systematic
nature of the parameters used to generate the Mondrian mask (this is a recognized
challenge and recent studies have given closer attention to such parameters, e.g. Drewes,
Zhu, & Melcher, 2018; Zhu, Drewes, & Melcher, 2016). Moreover, the function relating
how longer durations of suppression translate into the material that participants encode is
not necessarily simple. As such, although the experiments in this thesis suggest that
participants learned associations between, and pattern-completed intra-item features with
minimal influence of episodic or declarative representations, conclusions should not be
drawn about the specific intra-item features that were utilized in this study. Instead, the
key result is that it appears that pattern-completion can proceed for relatively low-level
visual representations, even with minimal mediation of higher level representations. This
result fits most easily with an account that claims that mnemonic processes are not tied to
specific representations.
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CHAPTER 6
FIGURES

Context

Conjunctive Whole

Intra-item
parts
Figure 1 A subset of the representational hierarchy
Circles depict learned representations and arrows depict an association that has been
learned between representations. Associations between representations within a level
of the hierarchy (e.g., between intra-item parts) are termed lateral associations,
whereas associations that span layers are termed vertical associations. Visual
recollection is defined as the process whereby a cue of one intra-item part elicits
retrieval of another intra-item part. Episodic recollection is defined as the retrieval of a
higher-level representation (e.g., conjunctive whole, context). This association
between intra-item parts is depicted as an incomplete arrow because it is unknown
whether visual recollection can occur without mediation by vertical associations. Note
that these figure is only designed as a schematic of the hierarchy; it is implicitly
assumed in this thesis that there are many more levels above, below, and in between
the levels depicted here.
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Figure 2: Example stimuli used in the Gollin Incomplete Pictures task. Figure
reproduced from Hirshman (1990).
In the Gollin Incomplete Pictures task, participants attempt to name line drawings of
objects. The objects are presented one at a time in increasing stages of completeness
(i.e. starting with the bottom image and progressing through the images from bottom
to top). Participants perform this task across multiple sessions, sometimes across
multiple days. Learning is indexed by the extent to which participants can identify the
object at an earlier state of incompleteness across sessions.
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Figure 3 Sample test questions in Experiment 1.
(a) sample stimulus to study (object 𝐴). (b) sample 2AFC question between two
matching parts both from the box (𝐴1 and 𝐴2 ) and mismatching parts, one from the
box (𝐴1 ) and one from a separate object (𝐵3 ). (c) sample naming question with the
same ‘box’ stimulus. Labels identifying the origin of the parts are shown here for
expository purposes and were not included in the experiment.
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Figure 4 Crossover interaction was observed in Experiment 1.
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Figure 5 State-Trace analysis of Experiment 1
Average performance on the two tasks in the four conditions, with predictions of the
best, single-latent-variable model overlaid as a dashed line; the fit of this single-latentvariable model was rejected in favor of a two-latent-variable model. Error bars
indicate within-subject standard errors including correction by (Loftus & Masson,
1994).
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Figure 6. Hypothetical cognitive models comparable with state-trace analyses.
Comparison of (a) unidimensional and (b) bidimensional cognitive systems.
Reproduced from (Dunn, 2008). Factor indicates levels of an experimental condition.
𝐴 and 𝐵 refer to latent psychological variables of interest. 𝑋 and 𝑌 refer to measured
outcomes in an experiment.
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Figure 7. Negative effect of measurement dependence on STA.
Panels depict hypothetical data with 0, negative, and positive correlation between task performance.
The method of Kalish et al. (2016) assumes the data look like the leftmost panel, but the middle and
rightmost panel are also possible. Such dependencies could inflate or reduce the Type I error rate. For
example, distributions that might appear to lie on a single state trace might more obviously lie on two
when there is positive dependence.
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Figure 8. Schematic of the Bayesian hierarchical multivariate probit model.
Each parameter of the model was sampled from a distribution, represented by a ~. A
subscript indicates when a parameter was sampled for multiple levels of a factor (e.g.,
items, participants, or condition). Distributions are labeled with either 𝑁 for normal
(either univariate or bivariate), Γ for gamma, or 𝐿𝐾𝐽 for Lewandowski et al. (2009),
which is a distribution of correlation matrices. In this diagram, vectors are indicated
both by a column vector layout (as in the case of the means of the bivariate normal
distributions) and via arrows. The diagram should be read beginning at the observation
(y), upwards. Priors are given at the top of the diagram, indicated by numeric values.
See text for further details.
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Figure 9 Simulated data for STA
a) Simulated monotonic and b) non-monotonic datasets, at each of 3 correlations.
Data are plotted in the unconstrained space, implying values over 0 in either
dimension would correspond to a correct response. Each dataset included 8000
observations. The ellipses indicate the 95% highest density interval of fitting a
bivariate normal distribution to these simulated datasets. Notice that the distributions
are highly overlapping.
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a)

b)

Figure 10 Experiment 2 task
a) Participants first completed a cued-recall, in which they encountered a circular
aperture that was either studied binocularly, studied under CFS, or not studied. b)
After the cued-recall, participants completed a speeded perceptual detection task in
which the inverse of the aperture either appeared out of the visual noise, or nothing
appeared out of the noise.
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a)

c)

b)

Figure 11 Descriptive plots of Experiment 2 performance
a) PAS ratings provided during the study phase. Participants followed the study
instructions, providing predominantly PAS ratings of either 2 or 3. b) Naming
accuracy on the cued-recall task. Naming accuracy increased with study. c) Go/no-go
performance. Performance was nearly perfect, participants rarely responded when the
target was absent and almost always responded when the target was present.
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Figure 12 Quintile analysis of Experiment 2
RT quintiles in the go/no-go task are plotted as a function of whether the cue was
named, and according to the study condition. Only trials in which participants
correctly indicated that an object was present (correct go trials) are shown. Error bars
indicate 95% Confidence Intervals around the mean.
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Figure 13 Posterior of the effect of study on the shift in the RT distribution.
The difference in posterior distribution of the main-effect of study in the CFS and
Binocular conditions, as compared to the Not-Studied baseline is shown. Values
below 0 (dashed line) indicate a speed-up. The error-bars indicate the 95% Highest
Density Interval.
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APPENDIX A
METHODS TO ASSESS CONVERGENCE OF HAMILTONIAN MONTECARLO
A primary question of inference in a Bayesian setting is: what is the likelihood of
a model given the data? Call the parameters of a model 𝜃 (which may be a single value or
a vector of parameters, depending on the model) and data with 𝑛 observations 𝑦1 , … , 𝑦𝑛
(where each observation may be a single value or a vector, as in the case of experiment 1
in which each observation was a pair of binary responses). To calculate that posterior
probability 𝑝(𝜃|𝑦), Bayes rule could be used
𝑝(𝜃|𝑦) =

𝑝(𝜃)𝑝(𝑦|𝜃)
,
𝑝𝑡 (𝑦)

where 𝑝(𝜃) is the prior probability of the parameters, 𝑝(𝑦|𝜃) is the likelihood of
the data given the parameters (referred to as the predictive density), and 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦) is the
likelihood of the data under the true data generating process. Unfortunately, Bayes rule is
almost never applicable directly, given that 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦) is unknown. Instead, an iterative
algorithm that relies on the Monte-Carlo (MC) method is used. MC methods rely only on
being able to calculate the relative likelihood of one set of parameters as compared to
another,

𝑝(𝜃1 |𝑦)
⁄ 2 . Given that 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦) is common to both the denominator and
𝑝(𝜃 |𝑦)

numerator of that ratio, 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦) cancels out and so the ratio is calculatable. A suitably
chosen MC algorithm can therefore generate samples from the posterior distribution.
However, MC methods are only guaranteed to converge on the posterior
distribution given infinite time, so some method of assessing their convergence is
required in any applied setting. Two methods of convergence were used in this thesis.
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One, the 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ is applicable to any MC method (Gelman & Rubin, 1992; Stan
Development Team, 2016). The other, counting divergences, is unique to the
Hamiltonian Monte-Carlo (HMC) method utilized by Stan.
The 𝑅̂ (and its adaptation, the 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ ) relies on the intuition that, if multiple
MC chains are constructed that start from a variety of starting points in parameter space,
convergence will have been achieved if they are exploring similar regions of parameter
space. It can be shown that an MC method will converge to a unique posterior
distribution (e.g., Levin & Peres, 2017), so the extent to which the chains are generating
similar samples is the extent to which they are generating from the same posterior
distribution. The 𝑅̂ is essentially an ANOVA calculated for each parameter, and its value
can be interpreted by analogy with an 𝐹 − 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒. An 𝑅̂ of exactly 1 says that the
variability of a parameter across chains is equal to the variability within chains; an 𝑅̂ of 1
indicates convergence. A common heuristic states that an 𝑅̂ greater than 1.1 indicates a
lack of convergence (Stan Development Team, 2016).
The 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ is an updated 𝑅̂ to account for the situation in which two chains are
sampling from approximately the same region of parameter space, but they have nonrandom and nearly opposite trajectories through that space. Consider the case of two
chains, each of which are generating samples from a single continuous parameter. One
chain might start at a low value of that parameter and gradually produce larger and larger
values of that parameter. The other chain might start at a high value of that parameter and
produce gradually smaller and smaller values of that parameter. In that case, the withinchain and between-chain variance will be approximately equal (resulting in an 𝑅̂ near 1),
but the non-stationary behavior of the two chains indicates a lack of convergence. The
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𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅̂ accommodates this scenario by splitting each chain in half, calculating 𝑅̂ on
these half chains.
The number of divergences provides another check that the MC algorithm has not
failed to converge, but this one is uniquely available to HMC (a type of which is
implemented in Stan called the No-U-Turn Sampler) (Betancourt, 2017; Betancourt &
Girolami, 2015). Divergences occur in regions of parameter space with rapidly changing
predictive density. The HMC algorithm generates samples by moving along the gradient
of the posterior distribution. Utilizing the gradient confers efficiency, enabling the
algorithm can rapidly explore the full posterior distribution. However, when there are
rapid and steep changes in the gradient, the chain may diverge, meaning that it proposes
parameters that have infinitely miniscule likelihoods. Due to the difficulty of sampling
from such regions, divergences (even just 1 or 2), indicate that the posterior distribution
may not have been fully explored13. To properly sample from such regions requires either
taking very small steps through parameter space (which is inefficient, will be much
slower to converge, and if the steps are small enough loses the benefit of being able to
notice regions where the parameter space is hard to explore), or by reparametrizing the
model.

13

Most other popular MC algorithm (i.e., Metropolis-Hastings algorithm or Gibbs Sampling), often miss
such regions of extreme curvature due to their relatively inefficient exploration of parameter space. That
said, if the region were discovered by such an algorithm, the lack of convergence could result in a 𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡 −
𝑅̂ much larger than 1 if a chain gets stuck near a highly curved region.
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APPENDIX B
WIDELY APPLICABLE INFORMATION CRITERION
The Widely Applicable Information Criterion (WAIC, also known as the
Watanabe-Akaike Information Criterion) was used for model selection (Watanabe, 2010).
The primary goal of this appendix is to provide a summary of the WAIC, validating it’s
use in model selection. The appendix is largely a summary of the description of the
WAIC provided by Vehtari et al. (2017). A general overview of the use of predictive
accuracy is presented next, followed by specifics of the WAIC.
Although Bayesian inference is not generally well suited or designed to make
binary decisions about parameters in a model (i.e., concluding that an effect is
‘significant’ if a single parameter crosses some threshold), a useful way to express
preference for one model as compared to others is to recast the inference as a question of
predictive accuracy. That is, a model can be chosen based on whether it is ‘best’ able to
predict new data in a replication. If a model makes highly precise predictions that turn out
to be accurate in a replication, that model could be chosen as the model (among the
models under consideration) that most closely resembles truth. In circumstances where a
replication is not available, the ability to predict new data must be estimated based on the
model’s ability to capture the trends in the data at hand. However, the ability to capture
all the patterns in the current data is often only conferred by extreme flexibility in a
model. Often, that flexibility results in overfitting, meaning that an overly flexible model
attempts becomes constrained by the idiosyncrasies of the data at hand (e.g., the
performance of a particular participant in a particular trial). When overfitting occurs, the
ability of a model to account for the data at hand will overestimate the ability of that
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model to predict a replication. For this reason, most measure of predictive accuracy
balance the ability of a model to predict the data at hand with some measure of the
flexibility of a model.
The WAIC is a measure of predictive accuracy that balances the fit of a model to
the present data with the variability in the number of ways that the model could account
for the data. Using the notation from Appendix A, the predictive accuracy of a model in a
replication, 𝑦̃1 , … 𝑦̃𝑛 , can be quantified with the posterior predictive distribution
𝑝(𝑦̃|𝑦) = ∫𝜃 𝑝(𝑦̃𝑖 |𝜃)𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑑𝜃. The posterior predictive distribution can be interpreted
as, given the inferences that were made on the data at hand (i.e., which parameters, 𝜃,
were deemed most likely after observed 𝑦), what is the likelihood of the data that were
observed in a replication? To have a single measure of predictive accuracy for models
that account for datasets of different sizes and different numbers of parameters, the
posterior predictive distribution can is replaced with the expected log14 pointwise
predictive density (elpd)
𝑛

𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑 = ∑ ∫ 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦̃𝑖 )𝑝(𝑦̃𝑖 |𝑦)𝑑𝑦̃𝑖 .
𝑖=1

The elpd for a new dataset can be interpreted as the amount by which a given
datum was predicted (𝑝(𝑦̃𝑖 |𝑦)), weighted by the true probability of having observed each
datum (𝑝𝑡 (𝑦̃𝑖 )), summed over the entire dataset.

14

The logarithm is used mostly for computational reasons. Given that the probability of a dataset is the
multiplication of the probability of each datum, the raw probability values would be miniscule – often
impossible to represent on the precision afforded by a computer. Working on a log-scale keeps the
probabilities in a manageable range.
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Since the elpd for a new dataset involves unknowable terms (i.e., involves the
likelihood of the true data generating process, 𝑝𝑡 (𝑦̃𝑖 )), its value must be estimated. The fit
of the current model is used to estimate the elpd via a term called the log pointwise
predictive density (lpd) of the current dataset
𝑛

𝑛

𝑙𝑝𝑑 = ∑ log p(𝑦𝑖 |𝑦) = ∑ log ∫ 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 |𝜃)𝑝(𝜃|𝑦)𝑑𝜃.
𝑖=1

𝑖=1

In practice, the lpd of the current dataset is computed using the results of an MC
simulation. Calling 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (𝜃) the posterior draws from an MC chain of length 𝑆 (i.e., if 𝜃
is the vector of parameters produced at once step of the MC algorithm, each element of
the chain is called 𝜃 𝑠 , 𝑠 = 1, … , 𝑆), define the computed log pointwise predictive density
̂)
(𝑙𝑝𝑑
𝑛

𝑆

𝑖=1

𝑠=1

1
̂ = ∑ log ( ∑ 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 |𝜃 𝑠 )) .
𝑙𝑝𝑑
𝑆
̂ is the average probability of each datum in a dataset given the posterior
The 𝑙𝑝𝑑
1

distribution (𝑆 ∑𝑆𝑠=1 𝑝(𝑦𝑖 |𝜃 𝑠 )), transformed via a log, and then summed over each datum
in the dataset.
̂ for the current
Given the issue of overfitting mentioned above, the lpd and 𝑙𝑝𝑑
dataset is an overestimate of the elpd for a new dataset. A penalty is required to account
for differently flexibly models. Many of the measures of information criterion (e.g.,
WAIC, BIC, AIC, DIC, etc.) differ in the way in which they measure flexibility. Some
methods simply count the number of parameters in a model. However, especially in the
case of a hierarchical model, the number of parameters is a poor proxy for model
flexibility. What is instead needed is some measure of the effective number of
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parameters, 𝑝. So, for example, we can define the WAIC estimate of the computed elpd
as
̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 = 𝑙𝑝𝑑
̂ − 𝑝̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
The WAIC penalizes models based on the variability of the likelihood of the data.
𝑛

𝑝𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 = ∑ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 (log 𝑝 (𝑦𝑖 |𝜃))
𝑖=1

Again, this term involves an unknowable element (the variability of the log of the
pointwise predictive density) and so must be estimated. The sample variance of a sample
1

𝑆
𝑎 of length 𝑆, defined as 𝑉𝑠=1
𝑎𝑠 = 𝑆−1 ∑𝑆𝑠=1(𝑎𝑠 − 𝑎̅𝑠 )2 (where 𝑎̅𝑠 is the sample mean)

provides the necessary estimation
𝑛
𝑆 (log
𝑝̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 = ∑ 𝑉𝑠=1
𝑝(𝑦𝑖 |𝜃 𝑠 )).
𝑖=1

The intuition behind using the variance of the pointwise predictive density is as
follows (Gelman, Hwang, & Vehtari, 2014). Consider a dataset 𝑦1 , 𝑦2 , … 𝑦𝑛 , where 𝑛 is
small and the true data generating distribution is 𝑦 ∼ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0,1). A class of models
for this data might be 𝑦 ∼ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(𝜇, 1), with a prior of 𝜇 ∼ 𝑁𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑙(0, 𝜎). Models
with larger values of 𝜎 in the prior will be better able to capture more trends in 𝑦. When
𝜎 is very large, the model could easily account for a variety of types of data; the posterior
distribution of 𝜇 will still put relatively large amounts of probability on a wide range of
values for 𝜇 (given that the small dataset does not provide sufficient constraint on 𝜇).
That is, the variability of 𝜇 𝑠 , for samples 𝑠 = 1,2, … 𝑆 will be high, and so will 𝑝̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 .
However, if 𝜎 were set to a small value (e.g., 1), the model is much less flexible, and the
resulting posterior distribution of 𝜇 would be much narrower. A narrower posterior would
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result in less variability in the likelihood of the data across each sample. 𝑝̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 will be,
appropriately, much lower in this latter case.
The final two requirements of using a measure of predictive accuracy to decide
between two models are 1) a measure of the variability in predictive accuracy, and 2)
some way to determine when a difference in accuracy is ‘significantly different.’ To
measure the expected variability in the WAIC, the calculation of standard errors proposed
̂ 𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶 ) =
by Vehtari et al., (2017) was used. That is, for an individual model, 𝑠𝑒(𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
𝑛 ̂
√𝑛𝑉𝑖=1
𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶,𝑖 . The standard error of the difference in fit between two models (e.g.,

model A and model B) is given by
𝑛
̂𝐴
̂𝐵
̂𝐴
̂𝐵
𝑠𝑒(𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
− 𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
) = √𝑛𝑉𝑖=1
(𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
− 𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
)
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶,𝑖
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶,𝑖

As a measure of the significance of the difference in fit, the threshold common in
frequentist settings of approximately 2 standard errors was adopted. That is, models are
considered to provide significantly different fits to the data when
̂𝐴
̂𝐵
̂𝐴
̂𝐵
𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
− 𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
> 2𝑠𝑒(𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
− 𝑒𝑙𝑝𝑑
).
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝐶
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